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Field
Abstract
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Before
Our research seeks to understand the impact of increasing workers’ input and participation in decision-making within a firm on outcomes, including productivity, retention and well-being. We are working with an automobile manufacturing firm in China on a set of randomized field experiments with production line workers and their managers.
First, we propose an experimental design that allows us to test whether giving workers the right to vote on a particular compensation policy improves performance when the voted policy is implemented. The randomization will entail giving workers in some teams the right to choose from two options that define their performance pay. The control teams will not be allowed to vote for their preferred pay policy but will be randomly assigned to the two options. We propose a second experimental design that examines the impacts of giving workers the right to evaluate their managers, where their evaluations will affect the bonus pay that managers receive each month.
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After
Our research seeks to understand the impact of increasing workers’ input and participation in decision-making within a firm on outcomes, including productivity, retention and well-being. We are working with an automobile manufacturing firm in China on a set of randomized field experiments with production line workers and their managers. We propose two experimental designs. The first looks at the effects of empowering workers by giving them more choice in determining their own compensation scheme. The second experiment looks at managerial compensation and its intersection with giving workers more voice in that process.
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