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Abstract
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Before
This experiment tests what influences the linking decisions between individuals through job referrals, and whether these social job networks are formed strategically. I randomly generate job opportunities for young job seekers from dense urban neighbourhoods in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Some participants are enabled to refer individuals from their neighbourhood to the same job, and I repeat this experiment for several rounds. Explanatory variables of interest are various referral treatment indicators, various measures of participants' network centrality, as well as dyadic characteristics of two individuals in the social networks. Outcomes of interest are a variety of referral indicators between two individuals as well as on-the-job performance.
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After
This experiment tests what influences the linking decisions between individuals through job referrals, and whether these social job networks are formed strategically. I randomly generate job opportunities for young job seekers from dense urban neighbourhoods in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Some participants are enabled to refer individuals from their neighbourhood to the same job, and I repeat this experiment for several rounds. Explanatory variables of interest are various referral treatment indicators, various measures of participants' network centrality, as well as dyadic characteristics of two individuals in the social networks. Outcomes of interest are a variety of characteristics of the referred worker, of referral indicators between two individuals, as well as on-the-job performance of the referred worker.
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Last Published
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March 02, 2021 01:51 PM
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After
March 03, 2021 07:33 AM
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Study Withdrawn
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No
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Intervention Completion Date
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February 28, 2017
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Data Collection Complete
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Yes
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Final Sample Size: Number of Clusters (Unit of Randomization)
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739 individuals from 16 neighborhoods
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Was attrition correlated with treatment status?
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No
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Final Sample Size: Total Number of Observations
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739 individuals from 16 neighborhoods
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Is there a restricted access data set available on request?
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No
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Program Files
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No
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Data Collection Completion Date
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August 31, 2018
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Is data available for public use?
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No
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Intervention (Public)
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Before
The study is a lab-in-the-field experiment on social network referrals in day labour markets.
The study comprises three different referral interventions:
1. Referral treatment (open, control) (C)
2. Referral treatment (performance incentivised) (T1)
3. Referral treatment (partly anonymous) (T2)
4. Referral treatment (fully anonymous) (T3)
In detail, the treatments/interventions are defined as follows: The control referral treatment (C) is an un-incentivized, open job referral, similar to `standard' job referrals mostly observed in reality. Workers in this group can invite someone from their neighborhood network to the next work session without incentives and `in the field'. Treatment variation 1 (T1) introduces an incentive treatment, meaning that the worker making a job referral gets a financial reward which is linear in the performance of the invited worker.The second margin of variation shocks the visibility of the referral. Workers in the control referral condition can additionally make partly anonymous or fully anonymous referrals to other workers. Under partly anonymous referrals (T2), the invited worker does not know the identity of the inviting worker, but can reciprocate the referral, while under fully anonymous referrals (T3), reciprocation is now allowed.
In general, the day work I am providing is similar to office-style, workplace-related jobs. The task performance is incentivised for all participants, with a maximum payment of 200 ETB (~ 7 GBP). Work sessions take place on consecutive days or are spread over a whole day. The multiple rounds of the experiment are unannounced ex ante (to ensure comparability between other/same referrals).
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After
The study is a field experiment on job referrals in day labor markets.
The study comprises three different referral interventions:
1. Referral treatment (open, control) (C)
2. Referral treatment (performance incentivised) (T1)
3. Referral treatment (partly anonymous) (T2)
4. Referral treatment (fully anonymous) (T3)
In detail, the treatments/interventions are defined as follows: The control referral treatment (C) is an un-incentivized, open job referral, similar to `standard' job referrals mostly observed in reality. Workers in this group can invite someone from their neighborhood network to the next work session without incentives and `in the field'. Treatment variation 1 (T1) introduces an incentive treatment, meaning that the worker making a job referral gets a financial reward which is linear in the performance of the invited worker.The second margin of variation shocks the visibility of the referral. Workers in the control referral condition can additionally make partly anonymous or fully anonymous referrals to other workers. Under partly anonymous referrals (T2), the invited worker does not know the identity of the inviting worker, but can reciprocate the referral, while under fully anonymous referrals (T3), reciprocation is now allowed.
In general, the day work I am providing is similar to office-style, workplace-related jobs. The task performance is incentivised for all participants, with a maximum payment of 200 ETB (~ 7 GBP). Work sessions take place on consecutive days or are spread over a whole day. The multiple rounds of the experiment are unannounced ex ante (to ensure comparability between other/same referrals).
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Primary Outcomes (End Points)
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Before
My main outcome of interest is whether individual i makes a referral to individual j as well as on the job performance of the invited worker.
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I measure the effects of the referral type on three main outcomes of interest: i) worker i’s productivity, expressed as correctly entered work teams, P_i, ii) worker i’s network centrality, measured as the number of (in or out) links at baseline, and iii) reciprocity: an indicator that equals one if worker j refers i to the job in period t-1, and i refers j in return in period t .
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Primary Outcomes (Explanation)
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The referral outcome is a binary indicator, measuring whether individual i is referring individual j to the day work. This outcome is measured at different points in time, after each round of the experiment.
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Experimental Design (Public)
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Before
Short summary:
- Baseline survey of over 700 individuals;
- Several rounds of a lab-in-the-field experiments with three different referral treatments;
- Follow-up phone survey of participants
Details:
- I randomly select 16 densely populated urban neighbourhoods in Addis Ababa, where I collect baseline data on young unemployed individuals and their social networks.
- Within the selected neighbourhoods, I take a census (door-to-door solicitation) of all eligible resident individuals, where eligibility is defined as follows: Permanently living in the selected neighbourhood; between 18 and years of age; not in permanent employment or education.
- These eligible individuals are surveyed with a baseline questionnaire, including questions on personal characteristics, labour market outcomes, behavioural questions, and a detailed social network section, containing a range of questions about every other eligible individual in the neighbourhood.
- I then conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment in various locations in Addis Ababa: After the baseline survey, a random subsample from each neighbourhood is invited to a paid day job (the lab-in-the-field experiment). Lab sessions take place separate by neighbourhood
- The sessions consist of a work-related and quantifiable effort task. After the completion of the task, participants are randomly allocated to different work referral treatments (described above). The day job experiment is repeated over three rounds.
- A few days after participating in the lab-in-the-field experiment, participants are called by phone and asked follow-up questions on the referral decisions they made.
- Eventually, this experiment tests what influences the linking decisions between participants through the different referral treatments, and whether these social job networks are formed strategically. A particular focus will be on the role of networks centrality in referring other workers vs. correlated social characteristics of individuals. A further focus will be on reciprocity in referring (measured over the multiple rounds of the experiment) as well as permanent exclusion from the temporary day labour market opportunities I am generating.
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After
Short summary:
- Baseline survey of over 700 individuals;
- Several rounds of a work experiments with three different referral treatments;
- (Short and long run) Follow-up phone survey of participants
Details:
- I randomly select 16 densely populated urban neighbourhoods in Addis Ababa, where I collect baseline data on young unemployed individuals and their social networks.
- Within the selected neighbourhoods, I take a census (door-to-door solicitation) of all eligible resident individuals, where eligibility is defined as follows: Permanently living in the selected neighbourhood; between 18 and years of age; not in permanent employment or education.
- These eligible individuals are surveyed with a baseline questionnaire, including questions on personal characteristics, labour market outcomes, behavioural questions, and a detailed social network section, containing a range of questions about every other eligible individual in the neighbourhood.
- I then conduct a work experiment in various locations in Addis Ababa: After the baseline survey, a random subsample from each neighbourhood is invited to a paid day job (the experiment). Sessions take place separate by neighbourhood
- The sessions consist of a work-related and quantifiable effort task. After the completion of the task, participants are randomly allocated to different work referral treatments (described above). The work experiment is repeated over three rounds.
- A few days after participating in work experiment, participants are called by phone and asked follow-up questions on the referral decisions they made.
- Eventually, this experiment tests what influences the linking decisions between participants through the different referral treatments, and whether these social job networks are formed strategically. A particular focus will be on the role of networks centrality in referring other workers. A further focus will be on reciprocity in referring (measured over the multiple rounds of the experiment) as well as permanent exclusion from the temporary day labour market opportunities I am generating.
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Planned Number of Clusters
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16 neighbourhoods, without clustering. All treatments are implemented in all neighbourhoods
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16 neighborhoods, without clustering. All treatments are implemented in all neighborhoods
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Planned Number of Observations
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Approximately 600 individuals
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Approximately 700 individuals
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Intervention (Hidden)
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The day labor work sessions are repeated over three consecutive rounds.
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The work experiment is conducted over three consecutive work days. Each work day with a job referral decision, yielding an individual-level panel of productivity and referral data. At first, I randomly invite two-thirds of all eligible individuals from the neighborhood to the first work session, while the remaining third does not get an invitation (for the first work session). Among those individuals working in the first session, half are randomly allocated to the control referral treatment, and the other half of participant workers get a treated referral opportunity. The treatment variations are the following: The control referral treatment (C) is an un-incentivized, open job referral, similar to ‘standard’ job referrals mostly observed in reality. Workers in this group can invite someone from their neighborhood network to the next work session without incentives and ‘in the field’. Treatment variation 1 (T1) introduces an incentive treatment, meaning that the worker making a job referral gets a financial reward which is linear in the performance of the invited worker. The second margin of variation shocks the visibility of the referral. Workers in the control referral condition can additionally make partly anonymous or fully anonymous referrals to other workers. Under partly anonymous referrals (T2), the invited worker does not know the identity of the inviting worker, but can reciprocate the referral, while under fully anonymous referrals (T3), reciprocation is now allowed.
Every participant can only make one referral to someone in her neighborhood, excluding referring oneself. The second work session is then comprised by individuals referred by the first round workers. I then again randomly provide half of the second-round workers with a control referral and the other half with a treated referral. Accordingly, the third work session is again composed of referred workers.
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