x

We will perform our scheduled update at 10:30 AM EST on DEC 13, 2017, for 20 minutes.
Determinants of demand and repayment in microcredit lending groups in rural Bangladesh
Last registered on August 14, 2017

Pre-Trial

Trial Information
General Information
Title
Determinants of demand and repayment in microcredit lending groups in rural Bangladesh
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0002347
Initial registration date
July 31, 2017
Last updated
August 14, 2017 5:20 AM EDT
Location(s)

This section is unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access to this information.

Request Information
Primary Investigator
Affiliation
LMU Munich
Other Primary Investigator(s)
PI Affiliation
Institute of Developing Economies, IDE-JETRO
PI Affiliation
LMU Munich
Additional Trial Information
Status
On going
Start date
2016-04-04
End date
2017-12-31
Secondary IDs
Abstract
In this study we analyze two aspects of microcredit group lending. First, we seek to analyze credit demand for different micro loans using choice experiments and data from an existing randomized evaluation in which four different loan products were randomly offered to clients. The choice experiments will help us to better understand take-up decisions of offered loans contracts in the field experiment. Second, we seek to analyze group structures of lending groups and how peer monitoring and punishment are applied to increase repayment performance of lending groups. We use lab-in-the-field experiments to study group structures and the role of the group leader. We combine this information with repayment data from the aforementioned randomized evaluation to understand the external validity of our lab findings.
External Link(s)
Registration Citation
Citation
Czura, Kristina, Simeon Schudy and Abu Shonchoy. 2017. "Determinants of demand and repayment in microcredit lending groups in rural Bangladesh." AEA RCT Registry. August 14. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2347/history/20391
Experimental Details
Interventions
Intervention(s)
We conduct lab-in-the-field experiments with clients of a microfinance institution that participate in a randomized evaluation of credit contracts. We invite borrowers of 76 borrowing groups to participate in three different experimental games. In the first two games we elicit behavioral drivers of group performance and leadership quality of the group leader. In the third game we conduct choice experiments for different loan contract characteristics.
Intervention Start Date
2016-04-05
Intervention End Date
2016-06-05
Primary Outcomes
Primary Outcomes (end points)
Trust, Trustworthiness, Contribution to public good, Beliefs, Default, Repayment discipline, Savings
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Repayment discipline 1: number of weekly repayments missed
Repayment discipline 2: share of repayments made on time (relative to total number of repayments)
Secondary Outcomes
Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Experimental Design
Experimental Design
We conduct lab-in-the-field experiments with various treatments. In our 3x2 and 2x2 design, we have a within subject design along the first treatment dimension and a between subject design along the second treatment dimension.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
- Assignment of players in game by draw of colored chip from opaque bag before game or by random allocation of decision sheets
- Randomization of treatment sequence and decision block done in office by a computer clustered at session level
Randomization Unit
Borrowing group
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes
Experiment Characteristics
Sample size: planned number of clusters
76 borrowing groups
Sample size: planned number of observations
1520 borrowers
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
1520 borrowers: treatments in lab-in-the-field experiments are mainly varied within subject. If not, procedures are specified in the experimental design description.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
We test several hypothesis for which we calculate the minimum detectable effect size based on our sample size, a power level of 80% and a significance level of 5%. The minimum detectable effect size of whether monitoring and punishment increase transfers is an increase of 0.2818 and 0.2930, respectively. The minimum detectable effect size of whether monitoring and punishment increase relative back transfers is 0.0295 percentage points and 0.0312 percentage points respectively. For testing whether leader monitoring and leader punishment are more effective in increasing transfers/ back transfers, the minimum detectable effect size is 0.4315 and 0.4372 for transfers and 0.0455 and 0.0491 percentage points for relative back transfers. In order to test whether the leader is followed more, the minimum detectable effect size is 0.0797 if the leader contributes, and 0.1290 if not. For the repayment data, we have a intra group correlation. When using a median split technique to identify groups with good and bad leaders, we have 50 % of groups with good and bad leaders. The minimum detectable effect size is 0.0882 when accounting for intra group correlation.
IRB
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (IRBs)
IRB Name
: Ethics Commission, Department of Economics, University of Munich
IRB Approval Date
2016-02-03
IRB Approval Number
Project 2016-03 "Determinants of demand and repayment in microcredit lending groups in rural Bangladesh"