Back to History

Fields Changed

Registration

Field Before After
Abstract Regulatory barriers to competition are often a significant obstacle to a more efficient resource allocation. An interesting case-study is offered by the hurdles and costs that would-be entrepreneurs face as they start a business in Italy, a country plagued by stagnating productivity. According to the Doing Business, “starting a business” sub-index, in 2017 Italy ranked 63rd (out of 190), down from 57 in 2016. In Italy, company incorporation requires a public deed of incorporation drafted and executed by a notary public. We focused on a new provision (introducing a simplified type of limited liability company with lower incorporation costs) to shed light on the extent to which notaries act as public officials (which supposedly justifies their monopoly power) as opposed to private professionals (who aim at maximizing private profits). We also provided an estimate of notaries’ markup and a general assessment of the effectiveness of the above-mentioned policy. The cost of starting a business in Italy is relatively high as compared with other EU member states. One reason is the cost of notarization, which is mandatory under the Italian law. In order to reduce this cost, in 2012 a new type of limited liability company was created—the simplified limited liability company—for which notarization should be provided free-of-charge. In this paper we explore the reasons behind the requirement of notarization and review the evidence from a few cases where notarization was made optional. Subsequently, we describe the results of an ad hoc experiment in order to evaluate the design of the policy. We performed a randomized control trial involving almost 350 notaries in Rome, Italy. We find that the majority of the notaries in our sample do not fulfill the obligation by asking a greater-than-zero fee, therefore suggesting the policy is not fully effective. We conclude that obliging notaries to perform specific tasks below-costs (or even free-of-charge) may not be an effective policy, leading to suboptimal results.
JEL Code(s) D23, C93, D43
Last Published November 04, 2017 10:34 AM March 14, 2019 03:23 AM
Additional Keyword(s) competition, notaries, rule of law, entry costs Notary, Competition, Italy,Liberalization,Productivity,RCT
Keyword(s) Electoral, Welfare Firms And Productivity, Other
Back to top

External Links

Field Before After
External Link URL https://www.rivisteweb.it/doi/10.1434/86962 https://rdcu.be/bpVkQ
Back to top

Papers

Field Before After
Paper Abstract La figura del notaio ha storicamente svolto un ruolo importante nel garantire la certezza delle transazioni, con particolare riferimento al trasferimento della proprietà di beni mobili e immobili. Tuttavia, con il crescente rafforzamento dei diritti di proprietà e la progressiva diffusione di tecnologie informatiche nella pubblica amministrazione, la necessità di un intermediario super partes, e con esso le riserve legali assegnate ai notai, sono oggetto di discussione, in particolare alla luce della natura «ibrida» del notaio, che è contemporaneamente pubblico ufficiale e libero professionista. Infatti un perimetro di riserva troppo ampio determina l'estrazione di una rendita monopolistica non giustificata dalla produzione di adeguati beni pubblici. Alternativamente alla liberalizzazione di alcune funzioni notarili, negli ultimi anni ai notai è stato richiesto di svolgere gratuitamente alcune attività (tra cui, in particolare, la costituzione di società in forma di Srl semplificata). Essendo pubblico ufficiale, il notaio dovrebbe svolgere con la stessa prontezza e cura tutte le attività, incluse quelle che non prevedono la percezione di un onorario, massimizzando il social welfare; contemporaneamente, il notaio è anche un libero professionista, e come tale si può presumere sia incentivato a dare la precedenza alle attività per cui ottiene un compenso, massimizzando così i propri ricavi. Questo articolo presenta i risultati di un esperimento condotto per verificare se, nel comportamento dei notai, prevalgano gli incentivi a comportarsi come «libero professionista» o come «pubblico ufficiale». L'esperimento, in particolare, è relativo all'obbligo per i notai di stipulare gratuitamente l'atto costitutivo per la «Srl semplificata». The cost of starting a business in Italy is relatively high as compared with other EU member states. One reason is the cost of notarization, which is mandatory under the Italian law. In order to reduce this cost, in 2012 a new type of limited liability company was created—the simplified limited liability company—for which notarization should be provided free-of-charge. In this paper we explore the reasons behind the requirement of notarization and review the evidence from a few cases where notarization was made optional. Subsequently, we describe the results of an ad hoc experiment in order to evaluate the design of the policy. We performed a randomized control trial involving almost 350 notaries in Rome, Italy. We find that the majority of the notaries in our sample do not fulfill the obligation by asking a greater-than-zero fee, therefore suggesting the policy is not fully effective. We conclude that obliging notaries to perform specific tasks below-costs (or even free-of-charge) may not be an effective policy, leading to suboptimal results.
Paper Citation Luciano Lavecchia, Carlo Stagnaro, Notai: pubblici ufficiali o professionisti privati? Evidenze da un esperimento di randomizzazione, in "Mercato Concorrenza Regole, Rivista quadrimestrale" 1/2017, pp. 79-104, doi: 10.1434/86962 Luciano Lavecchia, Carlo Stagnaro, "There ain’t no such thing as a free deed: the case of Italian notaries", Journal: European Journal of Law and Economics, DOI: 10.1007/s10657-019-09612-x
Paper URL https://www.rivisteweb.it/doi/10.1434/86962 https://rdcu.be/bpVkQ
Back to top