On the mechanics of the political resource curse: information and local elite behaviour in Mozambique
Last registered on November 29, 2017

Pre-Trial

Trial Information
General Information
Title
On the mechanics of the political resource curse: information and local elite behaviour in Mozambique
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0002493
Initial registration date
October 05, 2017
Last updated
November 29, 2017 1:11 PM EST
Location(s)

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Primary Investigator
Affiliation
University of Navarra
Other Primary Investigator(s)
PI Affiliation
Universidade Nova de Lisboa and NOVAFRICA
PI Affiliation
Universidade Nova de Lisboa and NOVAFRICA
PI Affiliation
Universidade Nova de Lisboa and NOVAFRICA
Additional Trial Information
Status
On going
Start date
2016-07-01
End date
2018-12-31
Secondary IDs
TW8R2/1008
Abstract
Mozambique discovered substantial natural resources in recent years. Known gas reserves in the Rovuma basin have the potential to transform Mozambique into a global player in Liquefied Natural Gas exports. Being a recent democracy, and with relatively weak institutions, Mozambique also faces considerable risks of resource and revenue mismanagement in the future, particularly since media independence and penetration are low and the level of political accountability is not improving. This RCT aims at understanding the effect of the distribution of information about the newly discovered natural gas in the Rovuma basin (Cabo Delgado Province) and about natural resources in general, and the effect of holding of citizen meetings to deliberate on the main priorities for spending the revenues from these resources, on the behaviour of villagers living in the Province.
External Link(s)
Registration Citation
Citation
Armand, Alex et al. 2017. "On the mechanics of the political resource curse: information and local elite behaviour in Mozambique." AEA RCT Registry. November 29. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2493/history/23600
Experimental Details
Interventions
Intervention(s)
The intervention we are evaluating consists on a large information and deliberation campaign about the discovery of natural resources in the Province of Cabo Delgado, focusing on the recent natural gas discoveries. In collaboration with our partners, we randomly allocated 200 communities to one of the following groups:
A. Control Group
B. Information provided to the Local Elite
C. Information provided to the Local Elite and the Citizens
D. Information provided to the Local Elite and the Citizens plus Deliberation

In the group D), the participants to the deliberation activity are divided into groups and each group is randomly allocated to one of the following voting procedure: raising hands; secret vote; no restrictions imposed on voting.
Intervention Start Date
2017-02-28
Intervention End Date
2017-04-03
Primary Outcomes
Primary Outcomes (end points)
Aspirations, Demand for political accountability, Information, Social capital, Trust, Attitudes towards Public Goods, Attitudes towards Rent-Seeking, Attitudes towards Corruption, Engagement with Local Leaders.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Trust, Attitudes towards Public Goods and Attitudes towards Rent-Seeking are measured using incentivized lab-in-the-field experiments (Dictator game, Trust game, Public good game, Rent-Seeking game) and a series of Structured Community Activities (SCAs).
Engagement with Local Leaders is measured with self-reported links with local leaders.
Secondary Outcomes
Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Consumption, Ownership of durable goods, Income and Assets, Political participation: turn-out and vote, Quality of deliberation process.

Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Political participation will be measured using administrative data post-2018 elections.
Quality of the deliberation process is measured from observation by the organizers of each deliberation group.
Experimental Design
Experimental Design
This study involves measuring outcomes at both the community and individual levels. Community-level outcomes are part of a single or one-level experimental design. Individual-level outcomes involve clustering at the community level and are considered through a two-level design.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Randomization done in office by a computer.
Randomization Unit
Randomization is at polling station level.
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes
Experiment Characteristics
Sample size: planned number of clusters
200 polling stations
Sample size: planned number of observations
2000 individuals + 200 village leaders
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
50 polling stations
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (IRBs)
IRB Name
Scientific Council at Nova School of Business and Economics
IRB Approval Date
2015-10-23
IRB Approval Number
N/A