| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field Trial Status | Before on_going | After completed |
| Field Last Published | Before November 29, 2017 01:11 PM | After April 23, 2021 07:43 AM |
| Field Study Withdrawn | Before | After No |
| Field Intervention Completion Date | Before | After April 30, 2017 |
| Field Data Collection Complete | Before | After Yes |
| Field Final Sample Size: Number of Clusters (Unit of Randomization) | Before | After 206 communities |
| Field Was attrition correlated with treatment status? | Before | After No |
| Field Final Sample Size: Total Number of Observations | Before | After 2,065 heads of household 206 local leaders |
| Field Final Sample Size (or Number of Clusters) by Treatment Arms | Before | After 50, 51, 50, and 55 communities in each treatment arm |
| Field Public Data URL | Before | After https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20190842 |
| Field Is there a restricted access data set available on request? | Before | After No |
| Field Program Files | Before | After Yes |
| Field Program Files URL | Before | After https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20190842 |
| Field Data Collection Completion Date | Before | After October 31, 2017 |
| Field Is data available for public use? | Before | After Yes |
| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field Paper Abstract | Before | After Natural resources can have a negative impact on the economy through corruption and civil conflict. This paper tests whether information can counteract this political resource curse. We implement a large-scale field experiment following the dissemination of information about a substantial natural gas discovery in Mozambique. We measure outcomes related to the behavior of citizens and local leaders through georeferenced conflict data, behavioral activities, lab-in-the-field experiments, and surveys. We find that information targeting citizens and their involvement in public deliberations increases local mobilization and decreases violence. By contrast, when information reaches only local leaders, it increases elite capture and rent-seeking. |
| Field Paper Citation | Before | After Armand, Alex, Alexander Coutts, Pedro C. Vicente, and Inês Vilela. 2020. "Does Information Break the Political Resource Curse? Experimental Evidence from Mozambique." American Economic Review, 110 (11): 3431-53. |
| Field Paper URL | Before | After https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20190842 |