| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field Was attrition correlated with treatment status? | Before | After No |
| Field Final Sample Size: Total Number of Observations | Before | After 78,882 speeding tickets |
| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field Paper Abstract | Before | After This paper studies the enforcement of fines, and, in particular, the effects of simplification and salience nudges on timely payments. In a randomized controlled trial, we add cover letters to 80,000 payment notifications for speeding. The letters increase the salience of the payment deadline, the late penalty, or both. Emphasizing only the deadline is not effective. Stressing the late penalty significantly and persistently increases payment rates. The effect is largest if both parameters are made salient. The most effective treatment yields a net revenue gain that covers approximately 25 percent of the labor costs of the ticket administration personnel. A survey experiment documents how the salience nudges alter prior (mis)perceptions about the communicated parameters. The survey results rationalize the differential effects of the treatments and, together with the evidence from the RCT, offer a broader framework for explaining why certain nudges are effective in some contexts but fail in others. |
| Field Paper Citation | Before | After DuĊĦek, L., Pardo, N. and Traxler, C. (2022), Salience and Timely Compliance: Evidence from Speeding Tickets. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 41, p.426-449. https://doi.org/10.1002/pam.22387 |
| Field Paper URL | Before | After https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/pam.22387 |
| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field Paper Abstract | Before | After This paper studies the enforcement of fines. We randomly assign 80,000 speeding tickets to treatments that increase the salience of the payment deadline, late penalties, or both. Stressing the penalties significantly and persistently increases payment rates. Emphasizing only the deadline is not effective. The findings from the RCT are consistent with a survey experiment which documents the treatments' impact on priors about parameters of the compliance problem. Exploiting discontinuous variation in fines, we then document a strong price responsiveness: a 1% increase in the payment obligation induces a 0.23 percentage point decrease in timely compliance. This semi-elasticity suggests that the impact of the salience nudges is equivalent to the effect of a 4-9% reduction in fines. |
| Field Paper Citation | Before | After Dusek, Libor, Nicolas Pardo, and Christian Traxler (2020), Salience, Incentives, and Timely Compliance: Evidence from Speeding Tickets, Discussion Paper 2020/09, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. |
| Field Paper URL | Before | After https://ideas.repec.org/p/mpg/wpaper/2020_09.html |