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Field
Trial Title
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Before
Contesting Criminal Gang Governance in Medellin: The Impacts of Intensive Municipal Governance and Community Organization on Gang Control and Governing of Neighborhoods
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After
State-building on the Margin: An Urban Experiment in Medellín
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Field
Trial Status
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Before
in_development
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After
completed
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Field
Abstract
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Before
In Medellin, a majority of neighborhoods are governed to varying degrees by criminal gangs. Between 150 and 300 local youth gangs called “combos” resolve disputes, enforce contracts, police and prevent crime, manage markets, and tax businesses in their territory. We have spent the past year intensively studying these organizations through extensive interviews with community members, leaders, police, government, as well as a large number of combo members and other criminal leaders, outside and inside prison. We have also observed two attempts by the city of Medellin to increase its level of control and governance in local communities, one militarized and one non-militarized. Based on these experiences, we have worked with the city government to design and scale up a version of the non-militarized approach to improve municipal and community control and governance. The aim is to displace combos from their community governance role and increase the strength and legitimacy of the formal state. The city has identified 80 neighborhoods where city and community governance is especially weak, and where combos are strong. Over the coming two years, the city will intensify its outreach and service delivery to a random sample of 40 of these neighborhoods. This includes full time liaisons and social workers who will focus on (1) helping organize community governance organizations and social groups, (2) problem solving and dispute resolution and training the community in effective communication strategies, and (3) coordinating delivery of existing city services where needed (such as welfare, legal, and maintenance services). We will study the impacts of this intervention qualitatively and quantitatively.
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After
Medellin's government wanted to raise its efficacy, legitimacy, and control. The city identified 80 neighborhoods with weak state presence and competing armed actors. In half, they increased non-police street presence tenfold for two years, offering social services and dispute resolution.
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Field
Last Published
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Before
April 04, 2018 05:55 PM
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After
January 15, 2022 12:38 PM
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Field
Study Withdrawn
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Before
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After
No
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Field
Intervention Completion Date
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Before
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After
December 31, 2019
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Field
Data Collection Complete
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Before
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After
Yes
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Field
Final Sample Size: Number of Clusters (Unit of Randomization)
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Before
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After
80 sectors
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Field
Was attrition correlated with treatment status?
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Before
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After
No
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Field
Final Sample Size: Total Number of Observations
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Before
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After
Approximately 2,362 survey respondents
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Field
Data Collection Completion Date
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Before
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After
December 31, 2019
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Field
Intervention (Public)
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Before
The city government aims to improve governance and increase service delivery to certain sectors (neighborhoods). The aim is to increase the strength and legitimacy of the state at the expense of organized criminal governance. The intervention will begin in Medellin and within the first year we expect to expand the program and evaluation to neighboring municipalities.
The office of the Secretary of Security in Medellin currently has a staff of city liaisons who work to maintain strong relationships with between the government and the community.
The street-level staff members in these units are community organizers and city liaisons ("community organizer" for short). Normally, the Secretariat of Security has 1-2 community organizers per comuna -- about 1 per 6,000 to 12,000 people. For the intervention, the Secretariat of Security will aim to have their usual one community organizer for the comuna, plus an additional 40 community organizers dedicated to 40 small sectors assigned to treatment. A sector is an informal neighborhood within a comuna and typically has an area between 1.5 to 4.5 Hectares.
Thus, the city will aim to provide treated sectors with roughly one city community organizer per 1300-2000 people. The city has very poor population estimates, however (a sign of state weakness), and so these population figures are at best guesses.
The main roles of the community organizers will be to:
1. Encourage the organization and functioning of community governance organizations and social groups, including locally elected bodies.
2. Connect residents to appropriate dispute resolution bodies in the city government, including the police, courts, or dispute resolution officials and train them in effective communication and dispute resolution skills.
3. Coordinating delivery of existing city services where needed (such as education, health, welfare, legal, and maintenance services).
Community organizers are not just simple liaisons. The idea is for them to interact with the community, get to know people individually, identify problems, capabilities and social capital, as well as the nature of criminal governance in the specific neighborhoods, to build the solutions from the bottom up. This implies there is not a predetermined strategy from the top, but rather that the day to day activities by these community organizers should be adaptive.
Community organizers are not the only face of the state but an interface that eases the way in which governance is provided. Once community organizers have identify main problems of the community they can use the networking of the liason of the Secretary of Security to address the problem to the right municipal agency. They should also identify whether community governance organizations are able to substitute for public officials as a first resource, and request the strengthening of these organizations with dispute resolution techniques that would be addressed with training received by the community organizers.
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After
NOTE: We participated in the JDE pre-results review process after the original registration but before the collection of results. That review contains the most recent analysis plan. See attached analysis plan a copy of this pre-results review.
The city government aims to improve governance and increase service delivery to certain sectors (neighborhoods). The aim is to increase the strength and legitimacy of the state at the expense of organized criminal governance. The intervention will begin in Medellin and within the first year we expect to expand the program and evaluation to neighboring municipalities.
The office of the Secretary of Security in Medellin currently has a staff of city liaisons who work to maintain strong relationships with between the government and the community.
The street-level staff members in these units are community organizers and city liaisons ("community organizer" for short). Normally, the Secretariat of Security has 1-2 community organizers per comuna -- about 1 per 6,000 to 12,000 people. For the intervention, the Secretariat of Security will aim to have their usual one community organizer for the comuna, plus an additional 40 community organizers dedicated to 40 small sectors assigned to treatment. A sector is an informal neighborhood within a comuna and typically has an area between 1.5 to 4.5 Hectares.
Thus, the city will aim to provide treated sectors with roughly one city community organizer per 1300-2000 people. The city has very poor population estimates, however (a sign of state weakness), and so these population figures are at best guesses.
The main roles of the community organizers will be to:
1. Encourage the organization and functioning of community governance organizations and social groups, including locally elected bodies.
2. Connect residents to appropriate dispute resolution bodies in the city government, including the police, courts, or dispute resolution officials and train them in effective communication and dispute resolution skills.
3. Coordinating delivery of existing city services where needed (such as education, health, welfare, legal, and maintenance services).
Community organizers are not just simple liaisons. The idea is for them to interact with the community, get to know people individually, identify problems, capabilities and social capital, as well as the nature of criminal governance in the specific neighborhoods, to build the solutions from the bottom up. This implies there is not a predetermined strategy from the top, but rather that the day to day activities by these community organizers should be adaptive.
Community organizers are not the only face of the state but an interface that eases the way in which governance is provided. Once community organizers have identify main problems of the community they can use the networking of the liason of the Secretary of Security to address the problem to the right municipal agency. They should also identify whether community governance organizations are able to substitute for public officials as a first resource, and request the strengthening of these organizations with dispute resolution techniques that would be addressed with training received by the community organizers.
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Field
Primary Outcomes (End Points)
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Before
We are principally interested in changes in (a) specific governance roles and services provided by the three relevant sets of actors the combo, the state, and community leaders and institutions; and (b) the relative perceived legitimacy of three actors.
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After
We are principally interested in changes in (a) specific governance roles and services provided by the three relevant sets of actors the combo, the state, and community leaders and institutions; and (b) the relative perceived legitimacy of three actors.
See the attached analysis plan for specifics (part of the JDE pre-results review process completed after the original registration but before the collection of results).
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Keyword(s)
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Before
Governance, Post Conflict
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After
Governance, Post Conflict
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Public analysis plan
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Before
No
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After
Yes
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Field
Secondary Outcomes (End Points)
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Before
Other outcomes of interest include:
1. Resident survey-based measures of perceived security
2. Crime reports
3. Application for subsidies and public services
To the extent they can be measured, we will also seek to measure “first-stage” outcomes to measure levels of service delivery and personnel per neighborhood sector.
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After
Other outcomes of interest include:
1. Resident survey-based measures of perceived security
2. Crime reports
3. Application for subsidies and public services
To the extent they can be measured, we will also seek to measure “first-stage” outcomes to measure levels of service delivery and personnel per neighborhood sector.
See the attached analysis plan for specifics (part of the JDE pre-results review process completed after the original registration but before the collection of results).
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Field
Building on Existing Work
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Before
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After
No
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