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Abstract I create randomised variation in farm security by matching randomly selected Kenyan smallholding farmers with subsidized Maasai watchmen to protect farms during the main agricultural season. I explore the effect of theft and property crime by testing whether farmers engage in different types of production when their farms are more secure against theft. I further explore how social networks are used to substitute for imperfect protection of property in an environment where state institutions are unable to fully protect farms, and how theft is used to sanction those who neglect social obligations. Finally, I test whether improved security and reduced fear of crime decrease the degree of ethnic ingroup-outgroup parochialism and political preference for authoritarian, `strongman' leaders. I create randomised variation in farm security by matching randomly selected Kenyan smallholding farmers with subsidized Maasai watchmen to protect farms during the main agricultural season. I explore the effect of theft and property crime by testing whether farmers engage in different types of production when their farms are more secure against theft. I further explore how social networks are used to substitute for imperfect protection of property in an environment where state institutions are unable to fully protect farms, and how theft is used to sanction those who neglect social obligations.
Trial End Date March 31, 2019 May 31, 2019
Last Published August 09, 2018 10:14 PM February 06, 2019 05:56 AM
Intervention End Date December 30, 2018 February 15, 2019
Keyword(s) Agriculture Agriculture, Crime Violence And Conflict
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