Field
Abstract
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Before
I create randomised variation in farm security by matching randomly selected Kenyan smallholding farmers with subsidized Maasai watchmen to protect farms during the main agricultural season. I explore the effect of theft and property crime by testing whether farmers engage in different types of production when their farms are more secure against theft. I further explore how social networks are used to substitute for imperfect protection of property in an environment where state institutions are unable to fully protect farms, and how theft is used to sanction those who neglect social obligations. Finally, I test whether improved security and reduced fear of crime decrease the degree of ethnic ingroup-outgroup parochialism and political preference for authoritarian, `strongman' leaders.
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After
I create randomised variation in farm security by matching randomly selected Kenyan smallholding farmers with subsidized Maasai watchmen to protect farms during the main agricultural season. I explore the effect of theft and property crime by testing whether farmers engage in different types of production when their farms are more secure against theft. I further explore how social networks are used to substitute for imperfect protection of property in an environment where state institutions are unable to fully protect farms, and how theft is used to sanction those who neglect social obligations.
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