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Communication is key! Communication and partnerships in the prisoner’s dilemma game
Last registered on February 13, 2018

Pre-Trial

Trial Information
General Information
Title
Communication is key! Communication and partnerships in the prisoner’s dilemma game
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0002735
Initial registration date
February 13, 2018
Last updated
February 13, 2018 2:45 PM EST
Location(s)
Region
Primary Investigator
Affiliation
Department of Economics, UoB
Other Primary Investigator(s)
PI Affiliation
Department of Economics, UoB
Additional Trial Information
Status
In development
Start date
2018-02-14
End date
2018-02-15
Secondary IDs
Abstract
Communication and language is ubiquitous in the evolution of cooperation. However, the power of language is frequently expressed in terms of solving complex problems that arise among people who need to coordinate their behavior to solve them (Wilson and Harris, 2017; Bickerton, 2009; 2014). If communication is to be regarded as a key ingredient for the achievement of a common good, should we not expect its merits to translate to the least complex dilemmas that often characterize everyday situations? Numerous problems are simple to solve coordination wise – one often needs to persuade only one other person to cooperate and not necessarily many. But, even in these seemingly simple situations the other person needs to choose to behave appropriately. The present paper examines if and how language is used to foster cooperation between two people in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game with mutual partner choice
External Link(s)
Registration Citation
Citation
Serdarevic, Nina and Sigve Tjøtta. 2018. "Communication is key! Communication and partnerships in the prisoner’s dilemma game ." AEA RCT Registry. February 13. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2735-4.0.
Former Citation
Serdarevic, Nina, Nina Serdarevic and Sigve Tjøtta. 2018. "Communication is key! Communication and partnerships in the prisoner’s dilemma game ." AEA RCT Registry. February 13. http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2735/history/25787.
Experimental Details
Interventions
Intervention(s)
The present paper examines if and how language is used to foster cooperation between two people in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game with mutual partner choice. We abstract from the coercive nature of the standard prisoner’s dilemma game and rather focus on mutual consent as a way to form partnerships. Subjects are given the option to mutually decide if they want to enter a partnership with another subject or not. If both subjects choose one another, they proceed to a production stage. If one or both subjects abstain from actively choosing one another, each is left with no partner and no earnings in the current round.
Intervention Start Date
2018-02-14
Intervention End Date
2018-02-15
Primary Outcomes
Primary Outcomes (end points)
Contributions, Earnings, frequency of exclusion, matching, language and content used in the chat, behavioral types
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
We will construct behavioral types by combinging the procedure outlined by Kurzban and Houser (2005) and Fischbacher et al., (2001). Codes will be available upon request.
Secondary Outcomes
Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Contributions given partner's contributions, correlation between personality traits and cooperative types, frequency of one-sided partner choice
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Experimental Design
Experimental Design
First, we elicit cooperative types in a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game. We also measure subjects’ personality traits with the Ten Item Personality Inventory (hereafter TIPI, Gosling, 2003). Second, subjects play a 10 period-repeated prisoner’s dilemma game within pairs of two subjects with either communication or no communication. Third, we re-elicit cooperative types to examine to which degree communication affects the willingness to change one’s cooperative strategy. The experiment will be programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Within session randomization using an urn.
Randomization Unit
Individuals are randomized into either treatment or control within each session. Clustering is expected to be on the group level (partnership).
Was the treatment clustered?
No
Experiment Characteristics
Sample size: planned number of clusters
108 clusters (partnerships) in total, 54 clusters in each treatment.
Sample size: planned number of observations
108 clusters in total
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
216 individuals in total, 108 individuals in each treatment
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (IRBs)
IRB Name
IRB Approval Date
IRB Approval Number
Analysis Plan

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Post-Trial
Post Trial Information
Study Withdrawal
Intervention
Is the intervention completed?
No
Is data collection complete?
Data Publication
Data Publication
Is public data available?
No
Program Files
Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials
Relevant Paper(s)
REPORTS & OTHER MATERIALS