Trading Fast and Slow

Last registered on May 04, 2018

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Trading Fast and Slow
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0002954
Initial registration date
May 04, 2018

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
May 04, 2018, 4:01 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
LUMSA

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
LUMSA
PI Affiliation
University of Trento

Additional Trial Information

Status
Completed
Start date
2015-06-01
End date
2017-06-01
Secondary IDs
Abstract
Financial bubbles cause misallocation of resources and even systemic crises. Experimental finance has long studied both the determinants of bubbles and institutional measures to prevent them. Within the framework of the dual process theory, we experimentally investigate whether traders under higher time pressure (Fast condition) behave differently than traders under lower time pressure (Slow condition). We show that the Slow condition heavily dampens market volatility relative to the Fast condition, and that the former generates prices that are overall consistent with the market's fundamental values, once risk aversion is accounted for. We also observe that traders in the Fast condition are prone to the gambler's fallacy, while those in the Slow condition are not.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Ferri, Giovanni, Matteo Ploner and Matteo Rizzolli. 2018. "Trading Fast and Slow." AEA RCT Registry. May 04. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2954-1.0
Former Citation
Ferri, Giovanni, Matteo Ploner and Matteo Rizzolli. 2018. "Trading Fast and Slow." AEA RCT Registry. May 04. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2954/history/29135
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2015-07-01
Intervention End Date
2017-06-01

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Bubble formation, prices, trade volumes
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
The design follows Smith et al (1988) experimental double auction markets design.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
voluntary registration to experimental sessions via ORSEE software
Randomization Unit
experimental session
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
20 sessions
Sample size: planned number of observations
200 subjects
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
100 subjects for each treatment
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
IRB Approval Date
IRB Approval Number

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials