Endogenous information revelation in common value auctions
Last registered on December 03, 2018

Pre-Trial

Trial Information
General Information
Title
Endogenous information revelation in common value auctions
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0002965
Initial registration date
June 27, 2018
Last updated
December 03, 2018 8:58 AM EST
Location(s)

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Primary Investigator
Affiliation
Other Primary Investigator(s)
PI Affiliation
University of Amsterdam
PI Affiliation
University of Amsterdam
Additional Trial Information
Status
In development
Start date
2018-06-28
End date
2019-04-30
Secondary IDs
Abstract
In a laboratory experiment with common value auctions, we study the impact of endogenously revealed information. The outcomes of interest are the revenue properties of different auction formats and the response of participants to information, e.g. by adjusting bidding strategies. In three treatments, we compare a second-price auction with an English auction with irrevocable exit (Japanese English auction) and an oral outcry auction.
External Link(s)
Registration Citation
Citation
Offerman, Theo, Giorgia Romagnoli and Andreas Ziegler. 2018. "Endogenous information revelation in common value auctions." AEA RCT Registry. December 03. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2965/history/38227
Sponsors & Partners

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Experimental Details
Interventions
Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2018-06-28
Intervention End Date
2018-10-31
Primary Outcomes
Primary Outcomes (end points)
Revenues, bids
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
We compare auction revenues as well as individual bidding strategies and their response to endogenously revealed information (effect of observed dropout prices on subsequent dropouts, effect of previously submitted bids on own submitted bids).
Secondary Outcomes
Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Experimental Design
Experimental Design
Three treatments, comparing a second-price auction, an English auction with irrevocable exit (Japanese English auction) and an oral outcry auction.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
- Normally distributed values and signals drawn before sessions by a computer
- Random assignment of participants into (matching) groups done by a computer during the experimental sessions.
Randomization Unit
Treatment assignment and values/signals are randomized across sessions. Within a session, participants are rematched into groups of 5 every period, within matching groups of 10 participants.
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes
Experiment Characteristics
Sample size: planned number of clusters
We will run 1 or 2 matching groups (clusters) per session and we aim for 10 matching groups of 10 subjects each per treatment.
Sample size: planned number of observations
300 participants in total.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
10 matching groups with 10 participants per treatment.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (IRBs)
IRB Name
Economics & Business Ethics Committee (University of Amsterdam)
IRB Approval Date
2018-05-25
IRB Approval Number
EC 20180525100536