Understanding Delegation in Delegated Dictator Games
Last registered on May 17, 2018

Pre-Trial

Trial Information
General Information
Title
Understanding Delegation in Delegated Dictator Games
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0002999
Initial registration date
May 15, 2018
Last updated
May 17, 2018 12:22 PM EDT
Location(s)

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Primary Investigator
Affiliation
University of California, Merced
Other Primary Investigator(s)
PI Affiliation
University of California, Merced
Additional Trial Information
Status
On going
Start date
2017-04-03
End date
2021-12-31
Secondary IDs
Abstract
We conduct a series of dictator experiments in which dictators can delegate their decision to another player. In the first experiment, two delegation treatments are considered, one in which the delegation option is equivalent to a choice of selfish payments (higher for the Dictator, lower for the Receiver) and another where delegation is equivalent to choice of generous/equal payments. Our interest in this experiment is in the extent to which delegation differs across treatments. A second issue that we investigate is who delegates - generous or selfish participants?
External Link(s)
Registration Citation
Citation
Gawn, Glynis and Robert Innes. 2018. "Understanding Delegation in Delegated Dictator Games." AEA RCT Registry. May 17. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2999/history/29593
Experimental Details
Interventions
Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2017-04-03
Intervention End Date
2020-12-31
Primary Outcomes
Primary Outcomes (end points)
Whether a participant delegates or not
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Secondary Outcomes
Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Who is delegating - otherwise selfish or otherwise generous?
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Experimental Design
Experimental Design
Participants choose an allocation for themselves and another participant, which can be selfish or generous, and which can be made directly or through delegation. Treatments vary in whether the delegation choice corresponds to a selfish or generous decision.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Distribution of experimental questionnaires in classrooms.
Randomization Unit
Individual
Was the treatment clustered?
No
Experiment Characteristics
Sample size: planned number of clusters
100-500
Sample size: planned number of observations
100-500
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
40-150 per treatment
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (IRBs)