Understanding Delegation in Delegated Dictator Games

Last registered on May 17, 2018

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Understanding Delegation in Delegated Dictator Games
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0002999
Initial registration date
May 15, 2018

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
May 17, 2018, 12:22 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
University of California, Merced

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
University of California, Merced

Additional Trial Information

Status
On going
Start date
2017-04-03
End date
2021-12-31
Secondary IDs
Abstract
We conduct a series of dictator experiments in which dictators can delegate their decision to another player. In the first experiment, two delegation treatments are considered, one in which the delegation option is equivalent to a choice of selfish payments (higher for the Dictator, lower for the Receiver) and another where delegation is equivalent to choice of generous/equal payments. Our interest in this experiment is in the extent to which delegation differs across treatments. A second issue that we investigate is who delegates - generous or selfish participants?
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Gawn, Glynis and Robert Innes. 2018. "Understanding Delegation in Delegated Dictator Games." AEA RCT Registry. May 17. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.2999-1.0
Former Citation
Gawn, Glynis and Robert Innes. 2018. "Understanding Delegation in Delegated Dictator Games." AEA RCT Registry. May 17. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2999/history/29593
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2017-04-03
Intervention End Date
2020-12-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Whether a participant delegates or not
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Who is delegating - otherwise selfish or otherwise generous?
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Participants choose an allocation for themselves and another participant, which can be selfish or generous, and which can be made directly or through delegation. Treatments vary in whether the delegation choice corresponds to a selfish or generous decision.
Experimental Design Details
Sample Instructions for the Plus 2A Experiment

In this experiment, you (player A) are matched with another student in a different classroom (player C). Each of you obtains a base payment of $3 for this experiment. Based on a decision that you make, this initial set of payments can be changed in the following way:

Payment Change: You can earn $2 more, with player C earning $2 less, for total payments of $5 to YOU and $1 to PLAYER C.

You will also be matched with two other students, players B and D, who are in a similar situation as you and player C. Both players B and D also get a base payment of $3 each, and player B decides whether to make the Payment Change, so that B earns $2 more (total of $5) and D earn $2 less (total of $1).

Once the experiment is over, we will calculate the percentage of all “player B’s” who chose to make the Payment Change (vs. not). We will call this percentage Q. For example, if half of player B’s choose to make the Payment Change, and half do not, then Q will be 50 percent.

YOU have three options:

Option 1: YOU choose to MAKE the Payment Change directly ($2 more for you and $2 less for player C).
In this case, the Payment Change will be implemented for you and player C with probability Q.

Option 2: DO NOT make the Payment Change (so that you and C each obtain the initial $3).
In this case, your choice – NO PAYMENT CHANGE – will be implemented with 100 percent probability.

Option 3: Implement PLAYER B’s decision.
In this case, if your matched player B chooses to make the Payment Change for himself/herself and his/her player D, then the Payment Change will be made for you and player C as well. Likewise, if your player B chooses not to make the change, then the Payment Change will NOT be implemented for you and player C.

You know what the Options are, but your player C DOES NOT. Player C only knows that someone else will make a choice that determines payments to both of you. Your decision does not affect Players B and D in any way.

YOUR DECISION: I choose ***PLEASE CIRCLE ONE***

Option 1 Option 2 Option 3
(MAKE the Payment (Do NOT make (Implement PLAYER B’s
Change directly) the Payment Change) decision)


Variations in Option Order: A variation on the above instructions switches the order of Options 1 and 3 (with Option 1 becoming the delegation option and Option 3 becoming the Payment Change option).

Instructions for the Plus 2B Experiment: The same as for Plus 2A, except the menu of options is:

Option 1: YOU choose to MAKE the Payment Change directly ($2 more for you and $2 less for player C).
In this case, the Payment Change will be implemented for you and player C with 100% probability.

Option 2: YOU choose NOT TO MAKE the Payment Change (so that you and C each obtain $3).
In this case, your choice – NO PAYMENT CHANGE – will be implemented with probability 1-Q. The Payment Change will only be made for you and player C with probability Q.

Option 3: Implement PLAYER B’s decision.
In this case, if your matched player B chooses to make the Payment Change for himself/herself and his/her player D, then the Payment Change will be made for you and player C as well. Likewise, if your player B chooses not to make the change, then the Payment Change will NOT be implemented for you and player C.

Sample Instructions for Parallel Dictator Game

In this experiment, you (player A) will be matched with another student in a different classroom (player C). Each of you obtains a base payment of $3 for this experiment. Based on a decision that you make, this initial set of payments can be changed in the following way:

Payment Change: You can earn $2 more, with player C earning $2 less, for total payments of $5 to YOU and $1 to PLAYER C.

Once the experiment is over, we will calculate the percentage of all A players who chose to make the Payment Change (vs. not). We will call this percentage Q. For example, if half of player A’s choose to make the Payment Change, and half do not, then Q will be 50 percent.

YOU have two options:

Option 1: MAKE the PAYMENT CHANGE ($2 more for you and $2 less for player C).
In this case, the Payment Change will be implemented for you and player C with probability Q.

Option 2: DO NOT make the Payment Change (so that you and C each obtain the initial $3).
In this case, your choice – NO PAYMENT CHANGE – will be implemented with 100 percent probability.

You know what the Options are, but your player C DOES NOT. Player C only knows that someone else will make a choice that determines payments to both of you.

YOUR DECISION: I choose ***PLEASE CIRCLE ONE***

Option 1 Option 2
(MAKE the Payment (Do NOT make
Change) the Payment Change)
Randomization Method
Distribution of experimental questionnaires in classrooms.
Randomization Unit
Individual
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
100-500
Sample size: planned number of observations
100-500
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
40-150 per treatment
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials