VOTER COORDINATION AND ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY: AN INFORMATIONAL EXPERIMENT IN MEXICO

A responsive and accountable political system has the potential to support economic development, public safety, and social stability by incentivizing good performance in office, legitimizing and strengthening local governments, and fostering community buy-in. However, many voters face a low-accountability political equilibrium where they expect poor performance from their politicians—both incumbents and
challengers—and politicians do not expect voters to sanction such poor performance. This study aims to understand how such low-accountability equilibria can be broken down through the provision of information to voters that is also designed to induce explicit or tacit coordinated electoral action. Building on recent studies highlighting mixed effects of information provision on electoral accountability, we implement a randomized controlled trial that disseminates independent audit report information pertaining to municipal malfeasance in office in Mexico. To understand whether voter coordination can help break low-accountability equilibria, our delivery of this information also varies the scope for coordinated action by further randomizing a) the fraction of the municipal population that receives the information, and b) whether that fraction receiving the information is common knowledge. These treatments are delivered en masse using municipal-level Facebook ad campaigns and individually using WhatsApp messages, respectively Mexico’s most popular social media website and messenger platform. We will assess the effects of these treatments—and their within municipality spillovers—on voter beliefs, coordination, and voting behavior. The findings will inform the extent to which voter coordination can complement information dissemination campaigns to break down low-accountability equilibria. Furthermore, we will also assess the extent to which our mass Facebook campaigns can achieve this objective at low cost, and thus constitute a scalable option for enhancing political accountability.