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Local Monitoring of Teacher Attendance in Afghanistan
Last registered on August 02, 2018

Pre-Trial

Trial Information
General Information
Title
Local Monitoring of Teacher Attendance in Afghanistan
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0003172
Initial registration date
July 30, 2018
Last updated
August 02, 2018 10:30 AM EDT
Location(s)
Region
Primary Investigator
Affiliation
Bocconi University
Other Primary Investigator(s)
Additional Trial Information
Status
In development
Start date
2018-04-01
End date
2018-12-31
Secondary IDs
Abstract
In this project, we study the willingness of teachers to report on the absenteeism of their colleagues. Teachers in a control group are told that their reports will be used only for an academic study, and will not be forwarded to the Ministry of Education (MoE). Teachers in the "low punishment" group will be told that the reports might be forwarded to the MoE, and that this might trigger a minor punishment like a small salary reduction. Teachers in the "high punishment" group are told that the reports might be forwarded to the MoE, which has recently instituted a committee for fighting absenteeism, and that reports might trigger serious punishments like contract terminations. This allows us to study whether teachers value having absentees punished, or if instead, they want to protect their colleagues, and how this varies with the severity of punishment. We interact this three treatments with monetary incentives and evaluate how they affect the willingness to report.
External Link(s)
Registration Citation
Citation
Fiorin, Stefano. 2018. "Local Monitoring of Teacher Attendance in Afghanistan." AEA RCT Registry. August 02. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3172-2.0.
Former Citation
Fiorin, Stefano. 2018. "Local Monitoring of Teacher Attendance in Afghanistan." AEA RCT Registry. August 02. http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3172/history/32555.
Experimental Details
Interventions
Intervention(s)
Employees from the MoE will receive phone calls from a research team collaborating with the MoE and will be asked to report on the absenteeism of their colleagues. Employees who are willing to participate will be randomized into six different treatment group along two dimensions. Some employee will be told the reports will only be used for an academic study, while others will be told that reports might trigger punishments (minor or severe) for their colleagues. Some employees will be offered monetary incentives for reporting, while others won't. Employees will then be given the names of ten colleagues and asked whether those colleagues were sometimes absent in the previous week or in the past.
Intervention Start Date
2018-07-30
Intervention End Date
2018-08-31
Primary Outcomes
Primary Outcomes (end points)
Willingness to report absenteeism
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Secondary Outcomes
Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Experimental Design
Experimental Design
1) control group: employees are told that their reports will be used only for an academic study, and will not be forwarded to the Ministry of Education (MoE);
2) low punishment group: employees are told that the reports might also be forwarded to the MoE and that this might trigger a minor punishment like a small salary reduction;
3) high punishment group: employees are told that the reports might be forwarded to the MoE, which has recently instituted a committee for fighting absenteeism, and that reports might trigger serious punishments like contract terminations;
4) monetary incentives group: employees are told that their reports will be used only for an academic study, and will not be forwarded to the Ministry of Education (MoE); they will also be offered a monetary incentive for each absentee they report;
2) low punishment monetary incentives group: employees are told that the reports might also be forwarded to the MoE and that this might trigger a minor punishment like a small salary reduction; they will also be offered a monetary incentive for each absentee they report;
3) high punishment monetary incentives group: employees are told that the reports might be forwarded to the MoE, which has recently instituted a committee for fighting absenteeism, and that reports might trigger serious punishments like contract terminations; they will also be offered a monetary incentive for each absentee they report.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
The randomization will be done on Stata.
Randomization Unit
The randomization will be done at the employee level, stratifying the treatment at the school level.
Was the treatment clustered?
No
Experiment Characteristics
Sample size: planned number of clusters
About 750 employees.
Sample size: planned number of observations
About 7500 observations (10 colleagues for each employee).
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
control group: 125 employees
low punishment group: 125 employees
high punishment group: 125 employees
monetary incentives group: 125 employees
low punishment monetary incentives group: 125 employees
high punishment monetary incentives group: 125 employees
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (IRBs)
IRB Name
UCSD Human Research Protections Program
IRB Approval Date
2018-08-01
IRB Approval Number
#180961S
Post-Trial
Post Trial Information
Study Withdrawal
Intervention
Is the intervention completed?
No
Is data collection complete?
Data Publication
Data Publication
Is public data available?
No
Program Files
Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials
Relevant Paper(s)
REPORTS & OTHER MATERIALS