Field | Before | After |
---|---|---|
Field Study Withdrawn | Before | After No |
Field Intervention Completion Date | Before | After March 01, 2020 |
Field Data Collection Complete | Before | After Yes |
Field Final Sample Size: Number of Clusters (Unit of Randomization) | Before | After 311 sub-district land offices |
Field Was attrition correlated with treatment status? | Before | After No |
Field Final Sample Size: Total Number of Observations | Before | After 1,034,688 applications and 2,869 phone interviews |
Field Final Sample Size (or Number of Clusters) by Treatment Arms | Before | After 155 treated sub-district land offices, 156 control sub-district land offices |
Field Is there a restricted access data set available on request? | Before | After No |
Field Program Files | Before | After No |
Field Data Collection Completion Date | Before | After December 30, 2020 |
Field Is data available for public use? | Before | After No |
Field | Before | After |
---|---|---|
Field Paper Abstract | Before | After Slow public service delivery and corruption are common problems in low- and middle-income countries. Can better management information systems improve delivery speed? Does improving the delivery speed reduce corruption? In a large-scale experiment with the Bangladesh Civil Service, I send monthly scorecards measuring delays in service delivery to government officials and their supervisors. The scorecards increase on-time service delivery by 11% but do not reduce bribes. Instead, the scorecards increase bribes for high-performing bureaucrats. A model where bureaucrats' reputational concerns constrain bribes can explain the results. When positive performance feedback improves bureaucrats' reputations, the constraint is relaxed, and bribes increase. |
Field Paper Citation | Before | After Mattsson, Martin, Information Systems, Service Delivery, and Corruption: Evidence from the Bangladesh Civil Service. Working Paper. (2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3986989 |
Field Paper URL | Before | After https://ssrn.com/abstract=3986989 |