We will investigate how the ability to communicate via anonymous computerized text chat and observability of individual contributions affect behavior in a three-person legislative bargaining game with contributed funds. We will examine how these features of the game influence bargaining power and outcomes.
External Link(s)
Citation
Baranski, Andrzej and Caleb Cox. 2018. "Communication in Bargaining with an Endogenous Fund." AEA RCT Registry. September 01. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3254-1.0.
contributions, proposer allocations, votes to approve or disapprove allocations
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Secondary Outcomes (end points)
chat messages in conditions with communication
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Experimental Design
There are four experimental conditions, all of which involve a bargaining game in which players first make contributions to a group fund, and then a random proposer allocates the resulting group fund among players. Players can vote on whether or not to accept the proposal. If the proposal is rejected, another random proposer is selected.
Condition NCNO is the baseline without communication or observable contributions.
Condition CNO introduces communication without observable contributions.
Condition NCO introduces observable contributions without communication.
Condition CO combines both communication and observable contributions.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Randomization to experimental conditions is done in office by computer.
Randomization Unit
Groups of participants (sessions) are randomized to experimental conditions.
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes
Sample size: planned number of clusters
20 sessions
Sample size: planned number of observations
240 participants
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
60 subjects (5 sessions) per experimental condition
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)