| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field JEL Code(s) | Before | After D73, H11, I15, I38 |
| Field Last Published | Before April 05, 2017 04:06 PM | After April 08, 2017 02:42 PM |
| Field Intervention Completion Date | Before | After April 09, 2012 |
| Field Data Collection Complete | Before | After Yes |
| Field Final Sample Size: Number of Clusters (Unit of Randomization) | Before | After 72 facilities |
| Field Was attrition correlated with treatment status? | Before | After No |
| Field Final Sample Size: Total Number of Observations | Before | After 72 facilities |
| Field Final Sample Size (or Number of Clusters) by Treatment Arms | Before | After 24 facilities sampled for indirect distribution ("voucher"), 48 facilities sampled for direct distribution 36 facilities sampled for audit treatment, 36 not sampled for audit treatment Among 48 facilities sampled for direct distribution: 24 sampled for bonus flat pay Among 48 facilities sampled for direct distribution: 24 sampled for large delivery Among 24 facilities sampled for voucher: half sampled to have two shops were vouchers can be redeemed |
| Field Is there a restricted access data set available on request? | Before | After No |
| Field Program Files | Before | After No |
| Field Data Collection Completion Date | Before | After December 31, 2014 |
| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field External Link URL | Before | After https://www.povertyactionlab.org/node/4678 |
| Field External Link Description | Before | After J-PAL evaluation summary |
| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field Paper Abstract | Before | After Distributing subsidized health products through existing health infrastructure could sub- stantially and cost-effectively improve health in sub-Saharan Africa. There is, however, widespread concern that poor governance – in particular, limited health worker accountability – seriously undermines the effectiveness of subsidy programs. We audit targeted bednet distribution pro- grams to quantify the extent of agency problems. We find that around 80% of the eligible receive the subsidy as intended, and up to 15% of subsidies are leaked to ineligible people. Supplementing the program with simple financial or monitoring incentives for health workers does not improve performance further and is thus not cost-effective in this context. |
| Field Paper Citation | Before | After Dizon-Ross, Rebecca, Pascaline Dupas, and Jonathan Robinson. "Governance and the Effectiveness of Public Health Subsidies: Evidence from Ghana, Kenya and Uganda." Working Paper, Janauary 2017 |
| Field Paper URL | Before | After https://www.povertyactionlab.org/sites/default/files/publications/444_Governance%26Effectiveness_PublicHealthSubsidies_Jan2017.pdf |