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Field
Abstract
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Before
The purpose of this research project is to find field evidence of hidden costs of control as they were found in the lab by Falk and Kosfeld (2006) (henceforth: F&K). Moreover, we aim to uncover heterogeneity in the population through elicitation of agents’ social preferences in a subsequent stage; and match social preferences to the behavioral response observed in the field.
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After
The purpose of this research project is to find field evidence of hidden costs of control as they were found in the lab by Falk and Kosfeld (2006). Moreover, we aim to uncover heterogeneity in the population through elicitation of agents’ social preferences in a subsequent stage; and match social preferences to the behavioral response observed in the field.
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Field
JEL Code(s)
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After
J2,M5
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Field
Last Published
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Before
October 23, 2018 09:28 PM
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After
October 24, 2018 04:52 PM
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Intervention (Public)
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Before
A control device is implemented in a natural work environment. We will investigate how workers react to such an implementation of control: Is there a negative behavioural reaction, i.e. do workers lower their effort once control is implemented?
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After
A control device is implemented in a natural work environment. We will investigate how workers react to such an implementation of control: Is there a negative behavioural reaction, i.e. do workers lower their effort once control is implemented?
Two groups:
1. Control group - incomplete contract (no control device)
2. Treatment group - contract with a minimum performance requirement (a weak control device)
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Field
Primary Outcomes (End Points)
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Before
Main outcome is clearly how workers effort is affected by the random assignment to the control and treatment group. Key outcome variables are thus workers effort, the treatment dummy, and outcomes of the GPS who help us to analyse heterogeneous treatment effects.
1) The main dependent variable is a proxy for effort ("POST_OO").
2) The second main outcome variable ("delta_OO") represents the change in the number of clicks on the opt-out button from stage 1 to stage 2, and is a proxy for effort change.
3) The key exogenous variable is the treatment dummy.
4) Main explanatory variables:
LACROSSE = a proxy for intrinsic motivation
NEGREC = preference for negative reciprocity
POSREC = preference for positive reciprocity
TRUST = preference for trust
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After
Primary outcome is how workers effort is affected by the random assignment to the control and treatment group. Hence, key outcome variable is workers effort. Effort respectively shirking is measured by the number of clicks on the opt-out button, measuring effort with regard to the incentivised effort dimension, i.e. supply.
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Primary Outcomes (Explanation)
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Before
1) POST_OO = number of clicks on the opt-out option after treatment induction (task 2), being
a proxy of effort respectively shirking for each individual i
2) PRE_OO = number of clicks on the opt-out option
in the pre-treatment stage (task 1), a
proxy of effort respectively shirking
for each individual i
delta_OO = POST_OO - PRE_OO representing the difference in
shirking frequency between posttreatment
and pre-treatment stage, for
each individual i
4) LACROSSE equals 1 if subject regularly watches or plays lacrosse. NEGREC, POSREC, and TRUST are elicited and computed according to the Global Preference Survey module (see Falk et al 2018).
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After
Primary outcome variables are POST_OO and delta_OO:
1) POST_OO = number of clicks on the opt-out option after treatment induction (task 2), being a proxy of effort respectively shirking for each individual i, directly observed
2) PRE_OO = number of clicks on the opt-out option in the pre-treatment stage (task 1), a proxy of effort respectively shirking for each individual i, directly observed
3) delta_OO = POST_OO - PRE_OO representing the difference in shirking frequency between post-treatment and pre-treatment stage, for each individual i, constructed
For a discussion concerning the exogenous variables/regressors, please refer to the attached pre-analysis plan.
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Experimental Design (Public)
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Before
The (public) description of the experimental design is kept to its minimum to avoid experimenter demand effects. The (hidden) description will become public once the study is completed and will help you to understand the design in further detail.
In short, in a real labor market, we create two groups: One groups receives an incomplete contract and is hence not subject no any controlling or monitoring device. The other group receives a more complete contract with a minimum performance requirement as a control device. First, all workers are assigned to an incomplete contract (HIT1). In a second stage, workers are assigned to one of the two mentioned groups (HIT2) and perform again a real-effort task. Some days or weeks after the real-effort task took place, workers demographics and social preferences are elicited by employing the Global Preference Survey (Falk et al, 2018).
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After
The (public) description of the experimental design is kept to its minimum to avoid experimenter demand effects. The (hidden) description will become public once the study is completed and will help you to understand the design in further detail.
In short, in a real labor market, we create two groups: One group receives an incomplete contract and is not subject no any controlling or monitoring device. The other group receives a more complete contract with a minimum performance requirement as a control device. First, all workers are assigned to an incomplete contract (HIT1). In a second stage, workers are assigned to one of the two mentioned groups (HIT2) and perform again a real-effort task. Some days or weeks after the real-effort task took place, workers demographics and social preferences are elicited by employing the Global Preference Survey (Falk et al., 2018).
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Intervention (Hidden)
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Please refer to the pre-analysis plan, where this is described in further detail.
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Secondary Outcomes (End Points)
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Before
refer to attached pre-Analysis plan
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After
Also, we will employ alternative dependent variables (non-incentivised effort dimensions) which are valid proxies for effort respectively shirking, too: First, the number of errors (representing quality) and second, the time used to complete the task.
We also construct further outcome variables - please refer to the attached pre-analysis plan for a detailed discussion.
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Secondary Outcomes (Explanation)
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Before
refer to attached pre-Analysis plan
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After
Please refer to the pre-analysis plan.
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