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Field
Trial Title
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Before
Hidden costs of control: evidence from
the field
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After
Does monitoring adversely affect worker performance? Evidence from a natural field experiment
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Field
Abstract
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Before
The purpose of this research project is to find field evidence of hidden costs of control as they were found in the lab by Falk and Kosfeld (2006).
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We conduct a natural field experiment with remote workers to assess potential adverse effects of monitoring.
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Trial End Date
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January 31, 2021
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After
March 01, 2022
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JEL Code(s)
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Before
J2,M5
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C93, D21, J24, M5
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Last Published
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Before
March 08, 2020 04:44 AM
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After
January 28, 2021 10:08 AM
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Intervention (Public)
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Before
A control device is implemented in a natural work environment. We will investigate how workers react to such an implementation of control: Is there a negative behavioural reaction, i.e. do workers lower their effort once control is implemented?
Two groups:
1. Control group - incomplete contract (no control device)
2. Treatment group - contract with a minimum performance requirement (a weak control device)
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After
A control device is implemented in a natural work environment. We will investigate how workers react to such an implementation of control: Is there a negative behavioural reaction, i.e. do workers lower their effort once control is implemented?
Two groups:
1. Control group - incomplete contract (no control device)
2. Treatment group - contract with a minimum performance requirement (a imperfect control device)
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Field
Intervention End Date
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Before
January 11, 2019
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March 12, 2020
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Primary Outcomes (End Points)
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Before
Primary outcome is how workers effort is affected by the random assignment to the control and treatment group. Hence, key outcome variable is workers effort. Effort respectively shirking is measured by the number of clicks on the opt-out button, measuring effort with regard to the incentivised effort dimension, i.e. supply.
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After
Primary outcome is how workers performance is affected by the random assignment to the control and treatment group. Hence, key outcome variable is workers performance. For further details, please refer to the pre-analysis plan.
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Primary Outcomes (Explanation)
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Before
Primary outcome variables are POST_OO and delta_OO:
1) POST_OO = number of clicks on the opt-out option after treatment induction (task 2), being a proxy of effort respectively shirking for each individual i, directly observed
2) PRE_OO = number of clicks on the opt-out option in the pre-treatment stage (task 1), a proxy of effort respectively shirking for each individual i, directly observed
3) delta_OO = POST_OO - PRE_OO representing the difference in shirking frequency between post-treatment and pre-treatment stage, for each individual i, constructed
For a discussion concerning the exogenous variables/regressors, please refer to the attached pre-analysis plan.
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After
For further details, please refer to the pre-analysis plan.
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Field
Experimental Design (Public)
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Before
The (public) description of the experimental design is kept to its minimum to avoid experimenter demand effects. The (hidden) description will become public once the study is completed and will help you to understand the design in further detail.
In short, in a real labor market, we create two groups: One group receives an incomplete contract and is not subject no any controlling or monitoring device. The other group receives a more complete contract with a minimum performance requirement as a control device. First, all workers are assigned to an incomplete contract (HIT1). In a second stage, workers are assigned to one of the two mentioned groups (HIT2) and perform again a real-effort task. Some days or weeks after the real-effort task took place, workers demographics and social preferences are elicited by employing the Global Preference Survey (Falk et al., 2018).
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After
The (public) description of the experimental design is kept to its minimum to avoid experimenter demand effects. The (hidden) description will become public once the study is completed and will help you to understand the design in further detail.
In short, in a real labor market, we create two groups: One group receives an incomplete contract and is not subject no any controlling or monitoring device. The other group receives a more complete contract with a minimum performance requirement as a control device. First, all workers are assigned to an incomplete contract (HIT1). In a second stage, workers are assigned to one of the two mentioned groups (HIT2) and perform again a real-effort task.
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Field
Planned Number of Observations
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Before
We will recruit 506 workers by setting the number of individual assignments on AMT for HIT1 to 506, anticipating a final sample of 248 subjects (due to attrition).
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For the calculation of power and the planned number of observations, please refer to the pre-analysis plan.
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Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
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Before
The resulting sample size yields 124 subjects per group who have completed all three tasks, that is HIT1, HIT2 and HIT3, so in total 248 subjects.
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For the calculation of power and the planned number of observations, please refer to the pre-analysis plan.
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Power calculation: Minimum Detectable Effect Size for Main Outcomes
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Before
A one-sided two-sample t test power calculation is computed based on the data presented in the attached pre-analysis plan. Power is set to 0.9, while alpha is set to 0.05. Our hypothesis is directional, and that is why we use a one-sided power calculation. The pilot data reveals that subjects in treatment NC click on average 3.147 times (out of 20) the opt-out button, while subjects in WC click it 3.75 times. Hence, the effect size results to 0.603. Standard deviation for NC yields 1.4798, while for WC 1.7413. The resulting sample size (one-sided) yields 124 subjects per group.
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For the calculation of power and the planned number of observations, please refer to the pre-analysis plan.
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Additional Keyword(s)
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Before
Organizational Economics, Hidden costs of control
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Monitoring, Hidden Costs of Control, Remote work, Field experiment
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Secondary Outcomes (End Points)
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Before
Also, we will employ alternative dependent variables (non-incentivised effort dimensions) which are valid proxies for effort respectively shirking, too: First, the number of errors (representing quality) and second, the time used to complete the task.
We also construct further outcome variables - please refer to the attached pre-analysis plan for a detailed discussion.
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After
For further details, please refer to the pre-analysis plan.
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