The design is similar to the original paper, as explained below (using authors' original text):
Our experiments use a public goods contribution setting. Subjects make their decisions on a computer. In the pilot, we plan to have 4 sessions. Each session has 15 subjects, and they are randomly divided into 3 groups of 5 subjects. In each round a subject is endowed with 20 tokens that could be invested in a private good or a public good. The private good pays $0.02 per token invested by the individual, and the public good pays $0.01 per token invested by the entire group. Each subject earns pay-off based on his investment in the private good and the total group investment in the public good. Subjects play with the same group of 5 people for 8 rounds, then are randomly re-matched to new groups for another 8 rounds, until they play with five different groups, each for 8 rounds. So, subjects play 40 rounds in total in each session.
A digital passport-style photograph is taken of each subject at the beginning of the experimental session. The photo is from the shoulders up and is displayed on top of the screen while subjects make decisions. At the end of each round, the total amount contributed to the public good by all group members is reported. There are two treatments: No Information and Information. In the Information treatment, both the photo and the contribution of that group member from the previous round are displayed. The contribution is listed below each photo, and the photos are rearranged each round with the highest contributor on the left and the lowest on the right. In the No Information treatment, only the photos of each group member are displayed on the screen and no information on individual actions is given.