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Field
Abstract
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Before
A long-held view in the economics literature is that lack of autonomy and incentives to exert effort or take risks stymies efficiency and the adoption of new practices by bureaucrats (Mookherjee 1998, Bloch and Bugge 2013). And yet, evidence on how to design incentive schemes that effectively prompt government officials to improve the quality of education remains limited (Wild et al. 2012). We propose a novel experiment in which we cross-randomize training in evidence-based and promising educational interventions and two types of incentives - towards a final goal, and towards a set of intermediate goals - among Upazila Nirbahi Officers (sub-district level government officials) in Bangladesh. The study aims to provide new insights into effective incentive design by investigating what combination of autonomy and financial incentives is more effective in increasing policy innovation and improving student learning outcomes.
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After
A long-held view in the economics literature is that lack of autonomy and incentives to exert effort or take risks stymies efficiency and the adoption of new practices by bureaucrats (Mookherjee 1998, Bloch and Bugge 2013). And yet, evidence on how to design incentive schemes that effectively prompt government officials to improve the quality of education remains limited (Wild et al. 2012). We propose a novel experiment in which we cross-randomize training in evidence-based and promising educational interventions and two types of incentives - towards a final goal, and towards a set of intermediate goals - among Upazila Nirbahi Officers (sub-district level government officials) in Bangladesh. The study aims to provide new insights into effective incentive design by investigating what combination of autonomy and non-financial incentives is more effective in increasing policy innovation and improving student learning outcomes.
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