| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field Last Published | Before December 18, 2019 05:23 AM | After December 23, 2019 05:06 AM |
| Field Study Withdrawn | Before | After No |
| Field Intervention Completion Date | Before | After November 23, 2018 |
| Field Data Collection Complete | Before | After Yes |
| Field Final Sample Size: Number of Clusters (Unit of Randomization) | Before | After 2 groups (though the difference between them isn't the main element of interest) |
| Field Was attrition correlated with treatment status? | Before | After No |
| Field Final Sample Size: Total Number of Observations | Before | After 231 people |
| Field Final Sample Size (or Number of Clusters) by Treatment Arms | Before | After 127 in the 2 screen treatment 104 in the 1 screen treatment |
| Field Public Data URL | Before | After https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/OXOGY3 |
| Field Is there a restricted access data set available on request? | Before | After No |
| Field Program Files | Before | After Yes |
| Field Program Files URL | Before | After https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/OXOGY3 |
| Field Data Collection Completion Date | Before | After November 23, 2018 |
| Field Is data available for public use? | Before | After Yes |
| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field Paper Abstract | Before | After Lying is an important human behaviour that has received unprecedented empirical attention in recent years due to a new experimental paradigm in which subjects are incentivised to misreport a die roll for financial gain. Amongst theoretical attempts to explain results, Justified Dishonesty (JD) is a theory with impressive support and a plausible psychological foundation. JD predicts subjects will swap a paid and unpaid roll of a die whenever financially beneficial, as this feels less like lying. However, JD’s predictions are virtually identical to a competing economic model. In Dufwenberg & Dufwenberg’s (DD) subjects have perceived cheating aversion, incurring a cost of lying that is in proportion to the amount they are perceived to cheat. Current evidence is unable to distinguish between these two distinct mechanisms. Here we show that JD often makes accurate predictions, but is a poor explanation. We perform a placebo test, finding that JD is more accurate when it should be irrelevant. Furthermore, we elicit the second (unpaid) roll, strongly rejecting a direct corollary of JD. Our results demonstrate that the role of justifications and desired counterfactuals have been overstated. The simple idea that subjects dislike others perceiving them as liars in proportion to the size of the lie is sufficient to explain patterns of lying behaviour. |
| Field Paper Citation | Before | After Clist, P and Hong, YY (2019) Why Do We Lie? Distinguishing Between Competing Lying Theories, CBESS Working Paper 19(03) |
| Field Paper URL | Before | After https://ueaeco.github.io/working-papers/papers/cbess/UEA-CBESS-19-03.pdf |