Wholesale Price Discrimination in Global Sourcing:Field Experiment on Alibaba

Last registered on November 19, 2018

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Wholesale Price Discrimination in Global Sourcing:Field Experiment on Alibaba
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0003557
Initial registration date
November 13, 2018

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
November 19, 2018, 10:51 PM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Rutgers University

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
University of Science and Technology of China
PI Affiliation
California State University, Stanislaus
PI Affiliation
Emory University

Additional Trial Information

Status
Completed
Start date
2018-07-29
End date
2018-08-30
Secondary IDs
Abstract
Past research has found price discrimination in B2C markets, where buyers are end customers. There is limited study on suppliers’ price quoting behavior and price discrimination on B2B markets. It is unclear whether characteristics of B2B buyers, who are often representatives of firms and not the end customers,would influence suppliers’ pricing decisions. In this research, we investigate whether there exists wholesale price discrimination, by conducting randomized field experiments on Alibaba.com, the world largest online global trade platform. We find that there is no significant difference in the wholesale prices quoted by suppliers to U.S. and South Africa buyers. We also find that suppliers quote a significantly higher wholesale price to White buyers than Asian or Black buyers across countries. However, price discrimination disappears when buyers present market information to sellers—providing the lowest wholesale price offered by other suppliers in the market, whereas price discrimination remains when buyers present social information to sellers—indicating the buyer is recommended by a previous customer. In addition, we find that market information can help buyers obtain a lower wholesale price because it signals a lower willingness to pay.Social information, however, can reduce price quotes for only Black and White buyers as it fosters trust, but not for Asian (particularly Chinese) buyers possibly due to the distrust between Chinese sellers and buyers.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Cui, Ruomeng et al. 2018. "Wholesale Price Discrimination in Global Sourcing:Field Experiment on Alibaba." AEA RCT Registry. November 19. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3557-1.0
Former Citation
Cui, Ruomeng et al. 2018. "Wholesale Price Discrimination in Global Sourcing:Field Experiment on Alibaba." AEA RCT Registry. November 19. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3557/history/37535
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Buyers sent messages to sellers between July 29, 2018 and August 30, 2018. Each message asks the seller to provide the price quote for 1000 units of the pre-selected product. The message content varies under different information conditions. In the “No information”condition, i.e., the control group, the buyer includes the most basic information in the inquiry message. In the “Market information” condition, the buyer reveals his expected price. The price can signal that the buyer is aware of the prevailing market price. In the message, after introducing himself,the buyer provides the market information “We have searched for the market price, and for this model the lowest price is USD [a specific dollar value]” prior to requesting the price quote. In the “Social information” condition, the buyer provides social information “Your company was recommended to us by a peer.” In the “Both information” condition, the buyer provides both market and social information in their inquiries.
Intervention Start Date
2018-07-29
Intervention End Date
2018-08-30

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
wholesale price
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Our paper aims to study sellers' wholesale price discrimination over buyers' origin and race and whether market and social information can mitigate the discrimination. We therefore design and conduct a three-way---Country*Race*Information---field experiment on Alibaba.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
randomization done in office by a computer
Randomization Unit
firm
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
3840 firms
Sample size: planned number of observations
3840
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
160 firms per treatment arm.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
California State University, Stanislaus
IRB Approval Date
2018-05-15
IRB Approval Number
1718-120

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials