Motivated Motive Selection
Last registered on November 30, 2018

Pre-Trial

Trial Information
General Information
Title
Motivated Motive Selection
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0003617
Initial registration date
November 30, 2018
Last updated
November 30, 2018 11:41 AM EST
Location(s)

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Primary Investigator
Affiliation
WZB Berlin
Other Primary Investigator(s)
PI Affiliation
WZB Berlin
PI Affiliation
WZB Berlin
Additional Trial Information
Status
In development
Start date
2018-12-03
End date
2019-12-02
Secondary IDs
Abstract
Lying costs and social preferences are perhaps the two most well-documented deviations from selfish maximization behavior in the economic literature. We hypothesize that in situations where both these motives are present and are in conflict, individuals may in a self-serving way put more weight on the motive that helps them maximize their earnings. We test this hypothesis using a laboratory experiment that allows us to document whether such motivated motive selection is present.
External Link(s)
Registration Citation
Citation
Barrron, Kai, Robert Stüber and Roel van Veldhuizen. 2018. "Motivated Motive Selection." AEA RCT Registry. November 30. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3617/history/38147
Experimental Details
Interventions
Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2018-12-03
Intervention End Date
2018-12-14
Primary Outcomes
Primary Outcomes (end points)
Dummy variable for whether participants selected the equality motive in part 2.
Dummy variable for whether participants selected the truth-telling motive in part 2.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Secondary Outcomes
Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Difference in the appropriateness score of the (1) truth-telling and (2) equality motive in part 3.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Experimental Design
Experimental Design
We use a laboratory experiment that shares a common basic structure with both the classic dictator game and the Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) lying game. In part 1 of the experiment, participants take on the role of the dictator and report a number that determines their payment and the payment of the recipient. In part 2 of the experiment, participants take on the role of a third-party dictator. In part 3, we elicit the social appropriateness of different choices in part 2 in an incentive-compatible way.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Random number drawn by a computer
Randomization Unit
Individual
Was the treatment clustered?
No
Experiment Characteristics
Sample size: planned number of clusters
140 individuals (approximately 116 Active and 24 Passive players)
Sample size: planned number of observations
140 individuals (approximately 116 Active and 24 Passive players)
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
50 Individuals (estimated)
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
See the attached power calculations for details
IRB
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (IRBs)
IRB Name
IRB Approval Date
IRB Approval Number