| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field Trial Status | Before on_going | After completed |
| Field Abstract | Before We study the impact of a portable "soft" commitment device on the financial behavior of low-income slum dwellers in urban Pune, India. The portable device may add value to existing commitment designs by activating its binding appeal precisely at the point in time when spending decisions are made. 1650 individuals will be randomly allocated to receive either a zip purse and a lock box (treatment arm) or a lock box only (control arm). Both groups are asked to formulate a savings goal and commit to a step-by-step individualized savings plan. We will estimate the causal impact of receiving the portable device on total savings amounts and temptation spending. Further, we will compare study arms with regards to their borrowing activity, expenditure levels, resilience to economic shocks, financial self-efficacy, and female empowerment. Findings from this study can enhance the current understanding of how commitment devices may help alleviate behavioral biases and temptations. | After We study the impact of a portable "soft" commitment device on the financial behavior of low-income slum dwellers in urban Pune, India. The portable device may add value to existing commitment designs by activating its binding appeal precisely at the point in time when spending decisions are made. 1650 individuals will be randomly allocated to receive either a zip purse and a lock box (treatment arm) or a lock box only (control arm). Both groups are asked to formulate a savings goal and commit to a step-by-step individualized savings plan. We will estimate the causal impact of receiving the portable device on total savings amounts and temptation spending. Further, we will compare study arms with regards to their borrowing activity, expenditure levels, resilience to economic shocks, financial self-efficacy, and female empowerment. Findings from this study can enhance the current understanding of how commitment devices may help alleviate behavioral biases and temptations. Additional study component: Trust game To measure spousal trust and trustworthiness, a behavioral lab-in-the-field experiment was conducted with a randomly selected subsample of 360 respondents and their spouses in additional home visits, after the household had been visited for the endline survey. |
| Field JEL Code(s) | Before D14, D91, I31, O12, O16 | After D14, D91, I31, O12, O16, J16 |
| Field Last Published | Before September 04, 2019 08:24 AM | After September 09, 2024 04:30 PM |
| Field Intervention (Public) | Before Treatment: The proposed intervention, named “Aaj bachat kara, udya khush raha” (Marathi for “Save today, be happy tomorrow”), consists of a portable savings device (zip purse) that is provided in addition to a stationary savings box. It is thereby hypothesized that the carry-around savings device fulfils both a reminder and earmarking function that may invoke feelings of guilt and failure if money is spent on temptation goods. The stationary device is a lockbox. Keys are distributed to the participant and his/her partner residing in the same housheold. The lock box can thus be opened at any time. Money thus retains its liquidity and can be accessed in urgent cases or emergencies. The intervention can therefore be conceived of as a “soft nudge” rather than a “hard” and fully coercive commitment. Savings devices are distributed to participants during home visits. In these visits, participants are also encouraged to formulate a savings goal and commit to an individualized savings plan that outlines specific steps on how to reach their savings goal. (Active) Control: The control group receives only the stationary and not the portable savings device. Similar to the treatment group, the device is delivered in home visits and participants are asked to formulate both a savings goal and detailed savings plan. | After Treatment: The proposed intervention, named “Aaj bachat kara, udya khush raha” (Marathi for “Save today, be happy tomorrow”), consists of a portable savings device (zip purse) that is provided in addition to a stationary savings box. It is thereby hypothesized that the carry-around savings device fulfils both a reminder and earmarking function that may invoke feelings of guilt and failure if money is spent on temptation goods. The stationary device is a lockbox. Keys are distributed to the participant and his/her partner residing in the same housheold. The lock box can thus be opened at any time. Money thus retains its liquidity and can be accessed in urgent cases or emergencies. The intervention can therefore be conceived of as a “soft nudge” rather than a “hard” and fully coercive commitment. Savings devices are distributed to participants during home visits. In these visits, participants are also encouraged to formulate a savings goal and commit to an individualized savings plan that outlines specific steps on how to reach their savings goal. (Active) Control: The control group receives only the stationary and not the portable savings device. Similar to the treatment group, the device is delivered in home visits and participants are asked to formulate both a savings goal and detailed savings plan. |
| Field Experimental Design (Public) | Before 1650 slum dwellers from the city of Pune, India, will be enrolled in the trial. 825 participants will be randomly allocated to the treatment group and 825 participants to the control group. Randomization will be stratified by participant sex, income, and present bias. Eligibility criteria are a) being 18 years and older, b) having some income (employment or other) at least once per week or on a monthly basis, and c) holding at least some decision making power over how money is spent. The study aims for a roughly equal share of female and male participants. | After 1650 slum dwellers from the city of Pune, India, will be enrolled in the trial. 825 participants will be randomly allocated to the treatment group and 825 participants to the control group. Randomization will be stratified by participant sex, income, and present bias. Eligibility criteria are a) being 18 years and older, b) having some income (employment or other) at least once per week or on a monthly basis, and c) holding at least some decision making power over how money is spent. The study aims for a roughly equal share of female and male participants. *** Additional study component: Trust game Design and procedures: Spousal trust and trustworthiness were quantified by a simplified binary trust game, in which spouses were randomly selected to act as the first and second mover, respectively (see Figure 1 below). The first mover was asked to decide between two payout options, namely (A) relying on the spouse’s decision to determine the final payout and accepting a potential loss in case the spouse will choose to default (proxy for trust), or (B) defining the final payout without relying on the spouse’s decision and thus a priori accepting a lower final payout (proxy for mistrust). If the first mover opted for decision (A), the second mover determined the final payout by choosing (A) whether to cooperate (proxy for trustworthiness) and receive equal payouts or (B) whether to default and thereby maximize the individual payout (proxy for untrustworthiness). Since the trust game was a sequential game and was only played once, each spouse only made one choice (single-role game). Thus, for every spouse, the game yields one decision, either in terms of trust or trustworthiness, depending on whether the spouse was randomly selected to be the first or second mover, respectively. Choices were kept private such that both spouses made their decisions without knowledge about the other movers’ choice. Payouts were selected to reflect gender-specific preferences, namely embroidered handkerchiefs for female subjects and plain handkerchiefs for male subjects. The payout amounts varied in the number of handkerchiefs to be received in the different scenarios determined through spouses’ choices and were chosen as such to maintain an incentive to maximize the own payout, i.e. by ensuring a sufficient gain in utility of receiving an additional handkerchief (see Figure 1 for exact amounts). The selection of gender-specific payouts was crucial in order to adequately measure individual trust and trustworthiness between spouses. Interchangeable payouts would be valued equally by both spouses and might thus motivate individuals to maximize payouts differently, e.g., according to a joint household payout. Moreover, gender-specific (as opposed to interchangeable) payoffs may reduce potential reciprocal or reputational effects of conducting a trust game between non-anonymous, cohabiting players. The team of enumerators that administered this study component was deliberately different from the one that conducted the main survey data collection. To internalize the rules and procedures of the trust game and to discuss potential difficulties during its conduction in the field, the team underwent an extensive three-day training. For the implementation of the trust game during home visits, we assigned two enumerators per household instead of one in order to ensure a clean implementation. This assured the isolation of spouses from each other during their decision-making processes and choice determination in the trust game as well as a detailed presentation of the choices and payouts. Constructed variables: The data from the trust game was used to create two types of variables, which will be used in the empirical analysis to detect heterogeneity in treatment effects: 1. Individual choices in trust game: This refers to the wife’s and the husband’s individual decisions to cooperate/deflect in the trust game (regardless of what the respective other mover chose). The corresponding variables indicate spouses’ trust and trustworthiness (each coded as 1 if a person cooperated, and as 0 if a person deflected). 2. Alignment of choices in trust game: We also account for whether the decision of one mover in the trust game was aligned with the other mover’s decision. We created two variables to quantify the alignment of choices in the trust game: First, a binary variable, coded as 1 if choices were aligned (i.e., both cooperated or both did not cooperate) and as 0 if they were misaligned. Second, a categorical variable that also specifies the type of alignment, i.e., that distinguishes between positive alignment (both cooperated), negative alignment (both did not cooperate) and no alignment. |
| Field Additional Keyword(s) | Before Savings, Temptation Spending, Soft Commitment Device | After Savings, Temptation Spending, Soft Commitment Device, Spousal Trust |
| Field Keyword(s) | Before Finance, Welfare | After Finance, Gender, Welfare |
| Field Building on Existing Work | Before | After No |
| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field Document | Before |
After
Pre-Analysis+Plan+Pune+RCT_JS.pdf
MD5:
66f4ecb4d2f3529a1db469e40a447b19
SHA1:
1e22286f0391a761716fd2276e134f8b689db396
|
| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field Affiliation | Before | After TUM |
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Field Title | Value Pre-Analysis Plan |
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Field Document |
Value
Pre-Analysis+Plan+Pune+RCT_JS.pdf
MD5:
6b7435cbaed5328949f298a5926d7aca
SHA1:
ea3cd915db215640f511c5ea6c39d65d67b4e4a0
|
| Field Title | Value Pre-Analysis Plan |