Paternalism and Incentives

Last registered on May 03, 2023

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Paternalism and Incentives
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0003801
Initial registration date
January 15, 2020

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
January 17, 2020, 11:13 AM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated
May 03, 2023, 12:30 PM EDT

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
New York University Abu Dhabi

Other Primary Investigator(s)

Additional Trial Information

Status
Completed
Start date
2020-01-20
End date
2023-05-01
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
This study analyzes the effects of incentives on paternalistic interventions on "repugnant transactions."
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Stüber, Robert. 2023. "Paternalism and Incentives." AEA RCT Registry. May 03. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3801-2.2
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2020-01-20
Intervention End Date
2021-08-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
- Participants' willingness-to-pay (WTP) for the offer being made or not made.
- Discrete decision whether to approve the offer or not. Participants choose between “Approve,” “Do not approve,” and “Undecided: Let chance decide.”
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
- Participants' belief about the fraction of people accepting the offer for various monetary amounts.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
The participants in the experiment decide whether to approve a "repugnant transaction."
Experimental Design Details
In the online experiment the participants decide whether to allow the experimenter to offer a third person monetary compensation of varying amounts for registering as a bone marrow donor. The experiment consists of five parts and a post-experimental questionnaire, and follows a 2x2x2 factorial design. The first factor varies between subjects and alters whether the participants i) reveal their willingness-to-pay for the offer being made or not, or ii) make a discrete decision whether to approve the offer or not by choosing between the options “Approve,” “Do not approve,” and “Undecided: Let chance decide.” The second factor varies within subjects and alters whether the participant makes her decision for a low/regular monetary amount (in treatment “LOW”) or a very high monetary amount (in treatment “HIGH”). The order of these two treatments is randomly varied in Part 1 and Part 2 of the experiment. Part 3 repeats HIGH but i) in the treatment condition (“TREATMENT”) the participants are informed that, even if they approve the offer, the offer is made only if the person would be willing to accept the offer for the low monetary amount and ii) in the low probability condition (“LOW_PROB”) the participants are informed that, even if they approve the offer, with a certain probability the offer is not made. Whether a participant participates in TREATMENT or LOW_PROB varies between subjects. Part 4 (“UG”) elicits the behindness aversion of all participants using responder decisions in an ultimatum game. In Part 5 (“BELIEFS”) participants’ beliefs about reservation prices are assessed. Participants are asked to state their beliefs about the fraction of people who are willing to register as a bone marrow donor for various monetary amounts of compensation. Finally, a post-experimental questionnaire (“QUEST”) asks participants whether they consider the offer in HIGH to be coercive, and elicits risk-preferences, a psychological measure of envy, and basic demographics.


Additional treatments (see "Pre-Analyis Plan (Main Study Part 2)" for details):


I conduct six additional treatments. I conduct four additional treatments to further explore the result that individuals are much more favorable of the high payment offer in treatment Reservation Price (above referred to as "TREATMENT"). The treatments fully replicate the already conducted treatments Reservation Price and Probability (above referred to as “LOW_PROB”) but differ in the third choices participants make (unless for Reservation Price Replication, with which I exactly replicate the original treatment Reservation Price). As for the initial treatments, one decision and one participant will randomly be determined and her choice will be implemented. First, I replicate the main treatment, treatment Reservation Price, with treatment Reservation Price Replication. Second, I test the degree to which participants are permitting the €500 offer to potential donors with a reservation price of €10 or lower, because willing to sign up for €10 signals being a prosocial or altruistic person in treatment Social. The instructions equal the instructions of treatment Reservation Price except that, in the third part of the experiment, participants make a decision for a potential payment of €500, but they know that even if they permit the offer, the offer will only be made if the potential donor independently agrees to donate from €100 she receives, at least €50 to the German Red Cross. Third, I test a potential policy tool to use high economic incentives to incentivize stem cell donors: In the third part of treatment Lottery, participants decide whether to approve an offer that pays €500 with a probability of 50% and with 50% probability pays only €10. Fourth, I conduct a treatment in which the participants are offered the expected value of the lottery, that is, €255 (treatment Medium).


Finally, I conduct two treatments for the finding that the share of ethicists seems to be higher in the ethics committees than in the general public. In treatment Hyp Rep, the participants from the representative sample decide to approve an offer concerning monetary compensation for becoming a stem cell and bone marrow donor. They decide for a €10-compensation in Low and a €500-compensation in High. Participants make simple discrete decisions as to whether to approve the offers or not. Choices are not incentivized. Treatment Hyp Rep IRB resembles treatment Hyp Rep with the only difference that the participants are asked to make their decision as if they were a member of an IRB. The instructions also make clear that the participants should make the decision in the way they would make the decision if they were a member of an IRB and not how they think members of an IRB would decide.

Detailled explanations of all treatments can be found in the pre-analysis plan "Pre-Analyis Plan (Main Study Part 2)."
Randomization Method
The randomization is done by a computer. The variable "id_in_group" randomizes participants into treatments.
Randomization Unit
The randomization unit is the individual.
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
About 1000 clusters.


Additional treatments (see "Pre-Analyis Plan (Main Study Part 2)" for details): 1300 clusters.
Sample size: planned number of observations
About 1000 participants. Additional treatments (see "Pre-Analyis Plan (Main Study Part 2)" for details): 1300 participants.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
Outcome 1: About 375 participants in the treatment group and 375 participants in the control group.
Outcome 2: About 125 participants in the treatment group and 125 participants in the control group.

Additional treatments (see "Pre-Analyis Plan (Main Study Part 2)" for details):

Treatment 1 "Reservation Price Replication": 200 observations (outcome 1).
Treatment 2 "Social": 200 observations (outcome 1).
Treatment 3 "Lottery": 200 observations (outcome 1).
Treatment 4 "Medium": 200 observations (outcome 1).
Treatment 5 "Hyp Rep": 250 observations (outcome 2).
Treatment 6 "Hyp Rep IRB": 250 observations (outcome 2).
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials

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IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
WZB Research Ethics Committee
IRB Approval Date
2019-01-22
IRB Approval Number
2019/1/59
Analysis Plan

Analysis Plan Documents

Pre-Analysis Plan

MD5: 710b33ef323402af549bac975e03379c

SHA1: 3ba5511a053a969949090828442369aebbc01b27

Uploaded At: January 15, 2020

Pre-Analyis Plan (Main Study Part 2)

MD5: b7a2096f50698c59a11006351afa4e71

SHA1: 0e045b6b684807fcee10842d8b521de251339a73

Uploaded At: June 04, 2021

Pre-Analyis Plan (Main Study Part 2 Attachment)

MD5: 30087a3a9b7e807d6bf25b465314791a

SHA1: c1058bceab310fbfb55f61d310966d5fd0459b0f

Uploaded At: June 04, 2021

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials