| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field Study Withdrawn | Before | After No |
| Field Intervention Completion Date | Before | After March 29, 2019 |
| Field Data Collection Complete | Before | After Yes |
| Field Final Sample Size: Number of Clusters (Unit of Randomization) | Before | After 398 individuals |
| Field Was attrition correlated with treatment status? | Before | After No |
| Field Final Sample Size: Total Number of Observations | Before | After 398 individuals |
| Field Final Sample Size (or Number of Clusters) by Treatment Arms | Before | After 136 controls, 131 treatment 1, 131 treatment 2 |
| Field Data Collection Completion Date | Before | After April 30, 2019 |
| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field Paper Abstract | Before | After We study whether opportunities to extract rents in a job affect the type of individuals who are attracted to it in terms of their underlying integrity. We do so in a laboratory experiment in which participants choose between two contracts that involve different tasks. We experimentally introduce the possibility of graft in one of them and study the sorting of subjects across contracts based on an incentivized measure of honesty. We find that the corruptible contract changes the composition of subjects attracting the most dishonest individuals and repelling the most honest ones. In addition, we observe extensive graft when the opportunity is available. Our results have clear policy implications to curb corruption. |
| Field Paper Citation | Before | After Pablo Brassiolo, Ricardo Estrada, Gustavo Fajardo, Juan Vargas, Self-Selection into corruption: Evidence from the lab, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 192, 2021, Pages 799-812, ISSN 0167-2681, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2021.11.001. (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268121004674) |
| Field Paper URL | Before | After https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2021.11.001 |