| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field Last Published | Before February 25, 2019 10:02 PM | After December 18, 2025 10:28 AM |
| Field Study Withdrawn | Before | After No |
| Field Intervention Completion Date | Before | After February 21, 2019 |
| Field Data Collection Complete | Before | After Yes |
| Field Was attrition correlated with treatment status? | Before | After No |
| Field Final Sample Size: Total Number of Observations | Before | After 401 employees, 47 managers |
| Field Final Sample Size (or Number of Clusters) by Treatment Arms | Before | After NoInfo: 205 employees, 23 managers Info: 196 employees, 24 managers |
| Field Data Collection Completion Date | Before | After February 21, 2019 |
| Field Keyword(s) | Before Firms And Productivity | After Firms And Productivity |
| Field Public analysis plan | Before No | After Yes |
| Field Building on Existing Work | Before | After No |
| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field Paper Abstract | Before | After Economists and management scholars have argued that the scope of incentives to increase cooperation in organizations is limited as their use signals the prevalence of free-riding among employees. This paper tests this hypothesis experimentally, using a sample of managers and employees from a large company. We exogenously vary whether managers are informed about prevailing cooperation levels among employees before they can set incentives to promote cooperation. In addition, employees matched to informed managers learn that the manager could base their incentive choice on cooperation levels. We find no evidence for the hypothesized signaling effect. Having an informed manager set the incentive does not change employees’ be-liefs about the cooperativeness of others. Incentives hence have strong positive effects on cooperative beliefs, irrespective of information. The absence of the signaling effect seems related to the perception of managers’ intentions, a mitigating but understudied factor. |
| Field Paper Citation | Before | After Deversi & Spantig (2023): "Incentive and Signaling Effects of Bonus Payments: An Experiment in a Company", CESifo Working Paper 10302 |
| Field Paper URL | Before | After https://www.ifo.de/en/cesifo/publications/2023/working-paper/incentive-and-signaling-effects-bonus-payments-experiment-company |