| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field Trial Status | Before in_development | After completed |
| Field Last Published | Before May 24, 2019 03:57 AM | After July 15, 2020 10:14 AM |
| Field Study Withdrawn | Before | After No |
| Field Intervention Completion Date | Before | After July 01, 2019 |
| Field Data Collection Complete | Before | After Yes |
| Field Final Sample Size: Number of Clusters (Unit of Randomization) | Before | After 80 sessions (more than 4 participants; as specified in the pre-analysis plan, we discarded sessions with less than 4 participants) |
| Field Was attrition correlated with treatment status? | Before | After No |
| Field Final Sample Size: Total Number of Observations | Before | After 494 participants |
| Field Final Sample Size (or Number of Clusters) by Treatment Arms | Before | After 176 participants in Insurance session, 156 participants in Insurance Information session, 162 in No Insurance session |
| Field Public Data URL | Before | After https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/KVFRFO |
| Field Is there a restricted access data set available on request? | Before | After Yes |
| Field Restricted Data Contact | Before | After [email protected] |
| Field Program Files | Before | After Yes |
| Field Program Files URL | Before | After https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/KVFRFO |
| Field Data Collection Completion Date | Before | After July 01, 2019 |
| Field Is data available for public use? | Before | After Yes |
| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field Paper Abstract | Before | After This paper provides experimental support for the hypothesis that insurance can be a motive for religious donations. We randomize enrollment of members of a Pentecostal church in Ghana into a commercial funeral insurance policy. Then church members allocate money between themselves and a set of religious goods in a series of dictator games with significant stakes. Members enrolled in insurance give significantly less money to their own church compared to members that only receive information about the insurance. Enrollment also reduces giving towards other spiritual goods. We set up a model exploring different channels of religiously based insurance. The implications of the model and the results from the dictator games suggest that adherents perceive the church as a source of insurance and that this insurance is derived from beliefs in an interventionist God. Survey results suggest that material insurance from the church community is also important and we hypothesize that these two insurance channels exist in parallel. |
| Field Paper Citation | Before | After Emmanuelle Auriol, Julie Lassébie, Amma Panin, Eva Raiber, and Paul Seabright. “God Insures Those Who Pay? Formal Insurance and Religious Offerings in Ghana,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, forthcoming |
| Field Paper URL | Before | After https://economics.harvard.edu/files/economics/files/ms27858.pdf |