There are numerous instances where people can only achieve their goals by coordinating their actions. Examples range from friends choosing a place for an evening out, through traders on financial and foreign exchange markets, to protesters against a political regime. The resulting coordination game that is often used to model such situations has multiple equilibria under complete information. Yet, information is rarely complete and the structure of the game is rarely a common knowledge. Even if a trader knows the fundamental value of a stock he can never be sure that it is also known to other traders, and a citizen going to an anti-government march can only guess how many people will gather on the streets. Moreover, in many of those situations information is not exogenous to the decision, and agents can choose to learn about fundamentals.
This leads to the question of how information acquisition affects game equilibria, and ultimately the agents' behaviour. Morris and Yang (2016) argue that uniqueness of the equilibrium is tightly connected to the technology of information acquisition. They show that a coordination game has a unique equilibrium whenever it is sufficiently easier to distinguish states that are further apart than nearby ones. Our goal is to test their insight experimentally.