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Field
Abstract
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Before
We model anti-competitive effects of entry within a search framework, and test the implications in an experiment in which the presence of entry (Y/N) and the share of uninformed buyers (15%;30%;60%) constitute the treatments. In our pilot study we observe prices that are broadly consistent with our theoretical findings.
The study is a randomized contolled trail performed in the Laboratory. The treatments in the no-entry condition (coreresponding to the "Model of Sales" by Hal Varian, AER 1980) serves as Control treatments.
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After
We model anti-competitive effects of entry within a search framework, and test the implications in an experiment in which the presence of entry (Y/N) and the share of uninformed buyers (15%;30%;60%) constitute the treatments. In our pilot study we observe prices that are broadly consistent with our theoretical findings.
We added a treatment in January 2020. This treatment increased the size of a market from three to six sellers in the entry condition with 30% uninformed buyers. Data collection for the added treatment is planned to take place at the LEE lab (Econ department/University of Copenhagen week 10/2020). Apart from the market size, the added treatment is identical to the first six treatments. The aim is to test the proposition that the market size does not impact on price setting. Like the other treatments we collect data on 8 matching blocks for the added treatment.
The study is a randomized contolled trail performed in the Laboratory. The treatments in the no-entry condition (coreresponding to the "Model of Sales" by Hal Varian, AER 1980) serves as Control treatments.
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