We investigate two types of two-player matrix-form games. The first is coordination games (with two equilibria) and the second is games where one player has a dominating strategy (one equilibrium). Overall, we have 8 games which belong to two families (4 coordination games and 4 with a dominating strategy). Within a family of games the differences between them are only in the monetary payoffs and the "location" of the equilibria. For each of the 8 games, the control is the 2x2 "base game" where each player has two pure strategies and he must choose one of them. The treatments (interventions), which we also call "extensions", are based on the same 2x2 game with one additional strategy to the row player (so that it becomes a 3x2 game). This strategy may be dominated by another strategy in the game, extreme compared to the other strategies or identical to one of the strategies, reflecting the three context effects we are interested in examining (attraction, compromise and duplication effect, respectively). The analysis will be based on comparing the distribution of choices of the different strategies in the control (base game) and the treatments (extensions) for each one of the 8 games. More specifically, we will compare the proportion of those choosing the strategy which is predicted to be chosen more often by the context effects (which we also call the "target") in the extensions to the proportion that choose it in the base game. We will hold such a comparison for each extension separately, both for specific games and for all 4 games of the same type. Our interest lies in whether or not this comparison shows differences in choice frequencies that are along the lines of the documented context effects in studies of individual choice.