Enhancing the Efficacy of Teacher Incentives through Framing: A Field Experiment*

Last registered on May 13, 2019

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Enhancing the Efficacy of Teacher Incentives through Framing: A Field Experiment*
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0004171
Initial registration date
May 02, 2019

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
May 13, 2019, 2:47 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
UCSD

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
University of Chicago
PI Affiliation
University of Chicago
PI Affiliation
Harvard Univeristy

Additional Trial Information

Status
Completed
Start date
2010-08-01
End date
2018-06-30
Secondary IDs
Abstract
In a field experiment, we provide financial incentives to teachers framed either as gains, received at the end of the year, or as losses, in which teachers receive upfront bonuses that must be paid back if their students do not improve sufficiently. Pooling two waves of the experiment, loss-framed incentives improve math achievement by an estimated 0.124 standard deviations (σ) with large effects in the first wave and no effects in the second wave. Effects for gain framed incentives are smaller and not statistically significant, approximately 0.051σ. We find suggestive evidence that effects on teacher value added persist post-treatment.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Fryer, Roland et al. 2019. " Enhancing the Efficacy of Teacher Incentives through Framing: A Field Experiment* ." AEA RCT Registry. May 13. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4171
Former Citation
Fryer, Roland et al. 2019. " Enhancing the Efficacy of Teacher Incentives through Framing: A Field Experiment* ." AEA RCT Registry. May 13. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4171/history/46333
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2010-08-01
Intervention End Date
2012-06-30

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Test scores
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
In a field experiment, we provide financial incentives to teachers framed either as gains, received at the end of the year, or as losses, in which teachers receive upfront bonuses that must be paid back if their students do not improve sufficiently.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
randomization done in office by a computer
Randomization Unit
Class level
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
288
Sample size: planned number of observations
5327
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
Approximately 1400-2700 observations
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
IRB Approval Date
IRB Approval Number

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials