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Enhancing the Efficacy of Teacher Incentives through Framing: A Field Experiment*
Last registered on May 13, 2019

Pre-Trial

Trial Information
General Information
Title
Enhancing the Efficacy of Teacher Incentives through Framing: A Field Experiment*
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0004171
Initial registration date
May 02, 2019
Last updated
May 13, 2019 2:47 PM EDT
Location(s)
Region
Primary Investigator
Affiliation
UCSD
Other Primary Investigator(s)
PI Affiliation
University of Chicago
PI Affiliation
University of Chicago
PI Affiliation
Harvard Univeristy
Additional Trial Information
Status
Completed
Start date
2010-08-01
End date
2018-06-30
Secondary IDs
Abstract
In a field experiment, we provide financial incentives to teachers framed either as gains, received at the end of the year, or as losses, in which teachers receive upfront bonuses that must be paid back if their students do not improve sufficiently. Pooling two waves of the experiment, loss-framed incentives improve math achievement by an estimated 0.124 standard deviations (σ) with large effects in the first wave and no effects in the second wave. Effects for gain framed incentives are smaller and not statistically significant, approximately 0.051σ. We find suggestive evidence that effects on teacher value added persist post-treatment.
External Link(s)
Registration Citation
Citation
Fryer, Roland et al. 2019. " Enhancing the Efficacy of Teacher Incentives through Framing: A Field Experiment* ." AEA RCT Registry. May 13. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4171-1.0.
Former Citation
Fryer, Roland et al. 2019. " Enhancing the Efficacy of Teacher Incentives through Framing: A Field Experiment* ." AEA RCT Registry. May 13. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4171/history/46333.
Experimental Details
Interventions
Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2010-08-01
Intervention End Date
2012-06-30
Primary Outcomes
Primary Outcomes (end points)
Test scores
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Secondary Outcomes
Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Experimental Design
Experimental Design
In a field experiment, we provide financial incentives to teachers framed either as gains, received at the end of the year, or as losses, in which teachers receive upfront bonuses that must be paid back if their students do not improve sufficiently.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
randomization done in office by a computer
Randomization Unit
Class level
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes
Experiment Characteristics
Sample size: planned number of clusters
288
Sample size: planned number of observations
5327
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
Approximately 1400-2700 observations
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (IRBs)
IRB Name
IRB Approval Date
IRB Approval Number
Post-Trial
Post Trial Information
Study Withdrawal
Intervention
Is the intervention completed?
No
Is data collection complete?
Data Publication
Data Publication
Is public data available?
No
Program Files
Program Files
Reports and Papers
Preliminary Reports
Relevant Papers