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Revelation of feedback: Evidence from a lab experiment.
Last registered on December 02, 2019

Pre-Trial

Trial Information
General Information
Title
Revelation of feedback: Evidence from a lab experiment.
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0004177
Initial registration date
December 02, 2019
Last updated
December 02, 2019 3:24 PM EST
Location(s)
Primary Investigator
Affiliation
University of Warwick
Other Primary Investigator(s)
PI Affiliation
University of Warwick
Additional Trial Information
Status
In development
Start date
2019-11-19
End date
2020-07-31
Secondary IDs
Abstract
This project aims to understand individuals' preferences for information about feedback on their own performance. In particular,
our goal is to learn how preferences over information about own performance are shaped by the presence of strategic incentives, subjective judgement by others and revelation of one's feedback to others. We will then also test the differences in these preferences by gender and its implications for belief formation about one's own performance.

External Link(s)
Registration Citation
Citation
Castagnetti, Alessandro and karmini sharma. 2019. "Revelation of feedback: Evidence from a lab experiment.." AEA RCT Registry. December 02. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4177-1.1.
Experimental Details
Interventions
Intervention(s)
The treatment conditions that we will implement are:
1) Presence or absence of the public versus private feedback
2) Presence or absence of extreme subjective judgment from others.
3) Presence or absence of strategic incentives to be chosen to be partnered with.
We test for the impact of these treatments by gender of the partcipants on their choice of more versus less informative feedback.
Intervention Start Date
2019-11-19
Intervention End Date
2020-07-31
Primary Outcomes
Primary Outcomes (end points)
-Choice of more informative feedback versus less informative feedback
-Prior and posterior beliefs about one's own performance in a task. (that is, probability with which participants think that they are in the top 50% of the performance distribution)

Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Secondary Outcomes
Secondary Outcomes (end points)
1) Beliefs about one's partners ability in the task. (that is, probability that their partner is in the top 50% of the performance distribution)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Experimental Design
Experimental Design
First, at the outset of the experiment, participants will perform a task. Following the task, participants will be asked to report their prior belief about their relative performance. After that, they will be randomly matched in groups of two and be asked to choose between more informative and less informative feedback while varying the presence of strategic incentives, subjective judgement by others and revelation of one's feedback to others.

In summary, according to their experimental group, participants are asked to choose between either more informative or less informative feedback. We vary the costs and benefits for the more informative feedback to understand whether apart from preferences for more information, choice of feedback is affected by our proposed treatments. These costs and benefits are explained in the intervention section.




Experimental Design Details
All participants perform a quiz task. After performance of the task, the participants are asked to state their beliefs about their performance in the task. Participants are also told that they will be incentivized according to how close they are to their actual performance. Each participant will be paired with one random other participant in the lab who will be referred to as their paired participant. According to their experimental group, participants are then asked to choose between more informative versus less informative feedback and also state their posterior belief after receiving their feedback. Thus, from a monetary perspective (that is, because beliefs are incentivised) participants have an incentive to choose more informative feedback. We will vary the features of the information environment to understand whether participants demand for information is affected by it in an environment where more precise information is incentivized (due to posterior beliefs). Before we move to detailed design, we lay out some definitions below: Public versus private feedback 1) Private feedback: If participants opt for private feedback, then only they will be provided feedback about their performance in the task. The feedback will be in terms of whether they are in the top 50% of their distribution or not. This feedback will be provided with an error. In particular, if they are in the top 50% (bottom 50%) then they may be provided with the feedback that they are in the bottom 50% (top 50%). But there will be a higher chance that they receive correct feedback (60%) than incorrect feedback. 2) Public feedback: If participants opt for public feedback, then both them and their paired participant will get to see their feedback about their performance in the task. The feedback will be in terms of whether they are in the top 50% of their distribution or not. This feedback will be provided with an error. In particular, if they are in the top 50% (bottom 50%) be provided with the feedback that they are in the bottom 50% (top 50%). But there will be a higher chance that they receive correct feedback (90%) than incorrect feedback. Thus public feedback is more informative than private feedback. The different treatments are: 1) Treatment 1 (private and public information): Participants get to choose between more informative feedback versus less informative feedback about their performance with the feature that choosing the more informative feedback will mean that their feedback is revealed to others as well. That is they get to choose between public and private feedback revelation. 2) Treatment 2 (subjective judgement): Participants get to choose between more informative feedback versus less informative feedback about their performance with the feature that choosing more informative feedback will mean that their feedback is shown to others and also comes with subjective judgment from others. This subjective judgement is designed to be extreme (extremely good or extremely bad). 3) Treatment 3 (strategic incentives): Participants get to choose between more informative feedback versus less informative feedback about their performance with the feature that choosing more informative feedback will mean that their feedback is revealed to others and others also get to decide whether they want to partner with them or not. Others have an incentive to only partner with high ability participants. 4) Control: Participants get to choose between more informative feedback versus less informative feedback about their performance In particular, we are interested in understanding whether the effect of the treatments is affected by the gender of the participants.
Randomization Method
Done by the computer software (oTree, Chen et al. 2016).
Randomization Unit
Individual.
Was the treatment clustered?
No
Experiment Characteristics
Sample size: planned number of clusters
0
Sample size: planned number of observations
700 participants
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
175 each in treatment 1, treatment 2, treatment 3 and control for a total of 700 participants.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (IRBs)
IRB Name
Internal Department of Economics Approval Process
IRB Approval Date
2019-10-31
IRB Approval Number
N/A
Post-Trial
Post Trial Information
Study Withdrawal
Intervention
Is the intervention completed?
No
Is data collection complete?
Data Publication
Data Publication
Is public data available?
No
Program Files
Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials
Relevant Paper(s)
REPORTS & OTHER MATERIALS