The effect of experience on cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas

Last registered on June 04, 2019

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
The effect of experience on cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0004262
Initial registration date
May 31, 2019

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
June 04, 2019, 12:13 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Tilburg University

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation

Additional Trial Information

Status
On going
Start date
2019-05-29
End date
2019-12-31
Secondary IDs
Abstract
We study finitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas in an experiment. We study whether the first round of defection moves earlier with experience once players have converged on a conditionally cooperative strategy.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Bigoni, Maria and Sigrid Suetens. 2019. "The effect of experience on cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas." AEA RCT Registry. June 04. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4262-1.0
Former Citation
Bigoni, Maria and Sigrid Suetens. 2019. "The effect of experience on cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas." AEA RCT Registry. June 04. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4262/history/47485
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2019-05-29
Intervention End Date
2019-12-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
overall cooperation rate; cooperation rate in the first ten supergames; cooperation rate in the last ten supergames; first round of defection
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
2x2-design:
inexperienced versus experienced
short prisoner's dilemma game versus long prisoner's dilemma game
Experimental Design Details
Participants in a lab experiment come to the lab two times. The first time they play a series of 30 repeated prisoner's dilemma (PD) games with randomly re-matched partners. They play either Easy4 or Easy8 as in Embrey, Frechette, and Yuksel (QJE 2018). Two days later they come to the lab with the exact same task, namely to play a series of 30 repeated PD games. They do not know that the task will be exactly the same at the point they come to the lab for the second time.

Hypothesis 1: Experience increases cooperation and does not move the first round of defection earlier in Easy8
Hypothesis 2: Experience widens the difference in cooperation and in first round of defection between Easy8 and Easy4
Randomization Method
Participants in the experiment are randomly allocated to a treatment (i.e. to play a short or long repeated PD game)
Randomization Unit
experimental session
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
8 (4 sessions with short games and 4 with long games)
Sample size: planned number of observations
160 participants
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
80 participants (across 4 sessions) by treatment (short versus long)
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
IRB Approval Date
IRB Approval Number

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

There is information in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access.

Request Information

Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials