Revealed-Incentives in Team Performance

Last registered on June 27, 2019
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Revealed-Incentives in Team Performance
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0004307
Initial registration date
June 12, 2019

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
June 27, 2019, 10:47 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country
Netherlands
Region
Tilburg

Primary Investigator

Name
Phuc Phung
Affiliation
Tilburg University
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Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Sigrid Suetens
PI Affiliation
Tilburg University
Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2019-06-13
End date
2019-10-31
Keywords
Firms & Productivity, Labor, Other, Welfare
Additional Keywords
Public Good Game, Team, Contribution, Image Motivation, Photo
JEL code(s)
Secondary IDs
Abstract
Using Public Good Game to examine contribution levels in teamwork, I assess whether in a context of no-anonymity, having heterogeneity in marginal per-capita return (MPCR) and/or knowing the MPCR of other team members can affect the average contribution level. I hypothesize that when participants in a team have different MPCR and can observe the MPCR of the other team members, contributions will increase. The “revealed incentives” in teamwork, represented by the MPCR, act as a noisy predictor of the private contributions and drive up the contributions as participants have “image motivation”.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Phung, Phuc and Sigrid Suetens. 2019. "Revealed-Incentives in Team Performance." AEA RCT Registry. June 27. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4307-1.0
Former Citation
Phung, Phuc and Sigrid Suetens. 2019. "Revealed-Incentives in Team Performance." AEA RCT Registry. June 27. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4307/history/48759
Sponsors & Partners
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2019-06-13
Intervention End Date
2019-10-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
The outcome of interest is the average contribution level to the public good in each team.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Using z-tree, we plan to conduct the computerized experiment at CentER lab in Tilburg University and recruit participants from our subject pool. In each session, subjects are randomly allocated to teams of three members and play the standard Public Good Game for 10 rounds. In each round, each member needs to allocate 20 tokens to their Private Account and the Team Account. The gain in each round is the sum of the private allocation and the total team contribution – scaled by the marginal per-capita return (MPCR). We implement a 2-by-2 factorial design with two treatment variables: Reveal-Hidden and Symmetric-Asymmetric. In Reveal-Hidden treatment, we either let subjects in a team see the MPCR of every team members or keep this information hidden. In Symmetric-Asymmetric treatment, we either set the MPCR the same for all team members (0.5) or different across team members (0.25, 0.5, 0.75). Moreover, subjects in a team are not anonymous to each other: the photos of the team members are displayed on the screen during the phase in which subjects need to make the allocation decision.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Randomization is done using lab computer.
Randomization Unit
Randomization is done at group level.
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
60 groups.
Sample size: planned number of observations
180 participants, composing 60 groups.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
We have a 2-by-2 factorial design, dividing 60 groups into 4 treatments.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
IRB Approval Date
IRB Approval Number
Analysis Plan

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials