Something to Complain About: Political Conflict, Voice and Grievance Redress Mechanisms

Last registered on June 29, 2019
View Trial History

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Something to Complain About: Political Conflict, Voice and Grievance Redress Mechanisms
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0004308
Initial registration date
June 12, 2019

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
June 29, 2019, 3:30 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country
India
Region
Bihar

Primary Investigator

Name
Ramakrishna Sharan Mamidipudi
Affiliation
Harvard University
Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Chinmaya Kumar
PI Affiliation
University of Chicago
Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status
On going
Start date
2019-05-17
End date
2020-06-01
Keywords
Crime, Violence, & Conflict, Electoral, Governance
Additional Keywords
Grievance Redressal, Political Coordination
JEL code(s)
Secondary IDs
Abstract
The process of development is uneven, often leaving behind political minorities and marginalized groups. In this paper, we present new evidence of historically marginalized groups using the relatively nascent technology of grievance redressal mechanisms to exercise voice, negotiate conflict and, crucially, attempt to make development more equitable. Our reduced form causal results establish the following: lower-tiered marginalized representatives - who are also members of the state - use grievance redressal mechanisms to lobby upper tiers of the state for improved public good provision. We then show that marginalized representatives are particularly likely to file grievances when there is some pre-existing conflict between them and their upper-tier counterparts. Potential for conflict also worsens public good provision. The objective of this experiment is to understand how, if at all, grievance filing by incumbent lower-tiered representatives from marginalized groups affects provision of water-and-sanitation (WAS) public goods in their jurisdictions. We also intend to measure spillover effects of grievance filing by representatives.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Kumar, Chinmaya and Ramakrishna Sharan Mamidipudi. 2019. "Something to Complain About: Political Conflict, Voice and Grievance Redress Mechanisms." AEA RCT Registry. June 29. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4308-1.0
Former Citation
Kumar, Chinmaya and Ramakrishna Sharan Mamidipudi. 2019. "Something to Complain About: Political Conflict, Voice and Grievance Redress Mechanisms." AEA RCT Registry. June 29. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4308/history/48926
Sponsors & Partners

There is information in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access.

Request Information
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)

Our objective is to understand how, if at all, grievance filing by incumbent lower-tiered representatives from marginalized groups (specifically Scheduled Castes - SCs) affects provision of water-and-sanitation (WAS) public goods in their jurisdictions. Specifically, we seek to answer the following questions:

(i) Does grievance filing by SC lower-tiered representatives initiate construction of WAS public goods in these jurisdictions?
(ii) Are there spillover effects of grievance filing - i.e does grievance filing by a lower-tiered representative in one jurisdiction result in more (a) grievance filing and (b) WAS public good construction in jurisdictions of other lower-tiered representative close to treated jurisdiction?
(iii) How does grievance filing change the nature of interaction between lower-tiered representatives and upper-tiered representatives/bureaucrats? How does it affect how the lower-tiered representative is perceived by their constituents?
(iv) If grievance redressal mechanisms are powerful tools, why, then, is grievance filing so low? Specifically, can information alone suffice to initiate grievance filing?
Intervention Start Date
2019-05-17
Intervention End Date
2019-06-30

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
(i) WAS Asset Construction (from WAS MIS Data/Endline Survey)
(ii) Grievance Filing (from Grievance Redressal MIS data/Endline Data)
(iii) Political and Bureaucratic Effects (Endline Survey of lower- and upper-tiered representatives and citizens)
(iv) Perceived state capacity
(v) Process outcomes related to grievance hearings
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Political and Bureaucratic Effects (Endline Survey of lower- and upper-tiered representatives and citizens)

Whether lower-tiered representatives face any backlash from their upper-tiered counterparts. This includes:

(i) Increased contact by upper-tiered representatives
(ii) Threatening/harrassment by the upper-tiered representative
(iii) Perceived efficacy of the lower-tiered representative among ward constituents/other neighbouring lower-tiered representatives and their upper-tiered counterpart

Perceived state capacity

(i) Lower-tiered representatives views on efficacy of government
(ii) Lower-tiered representatives views on responsiveness of upper-bureaucracy, political class and incumbent government.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
All treatments are administered over the phone in our setting. The experiment comprises two treatments arms: a grievance-filing (G) treatment and an information-only (I) treatment.

In Treatment G, we call randomly sampled SC lower-tiered representatives where, as per official records, no WAS work has been undertaken and provided them information about the grievance redressal scheme and offer to file grievances on the representatives' behalf. Our main objective here is to measure the impact of grievance filing on WAS public good provision.

In Treatment I, we call randomly sampled SC lower-tiered politicians and only provide information. The key difference between Treatment G and Treatment I is that in the latter, we do not offer to file grievances. Our main objective here is to see if information alone suffices to increase the number of grievances filed.

We intend to treat about 800 representatives with Treatment G, 150 representatives with treatment I and 800 control representatives.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Randomization done by the ODK software that is used by enumerators on their phones in two ways:

(a) Treatment G vs Control: randomized with equal probability (50 % each).
(b) Treatment G and Treatment I vs Control: Randomized with equal probability (33.33 % each).
Randomization Unit
Ward.
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
1750
Sample size: planned number of observations
1750
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
800 Treatment G wards, 150 Treatment I wards, 800 Control wards.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Harvard University
IRB Approval Date
2019-06-16
IRB Approval Number
IRB00000109
Analysis Plan

There is information in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access.

Request Information

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

There is information in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access.

Request Information

Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials