|
Field
Trial Title
|
Before
The impact of voting rules on moral decision making in groups
|
After
The impact of voting rules on moral decisions: Free-riding or guilt sharing?
|
|
Field
Trial Status
|
Before
in_development
|
After
on_going
|
|
Field
Abstract
|
Before
We plan to experimentally test the effect of voting rules on the likelihood that individuals vote for moral transgression. Subjects vote independently from each other but monetary benefits are equally divided among group members. Our first hypothesis is based on a theoretical model which (in case of consequentialist moral costs) shows that the number of votes for moral transgression increases in the number of votes required (voting threshold). Our second hypothesis is that guilt sharing among group members is a main driver of this result. We test the second hypotheses by a sequential elimination of other motivational factors (financial incentives, up-dates on the preferences of group members and social conformity).
|
After
We experimentally analyze how and why the minimum number of votes required
for a moral transgression (the "voting threshold"') influences the
frequency of votes in favor of it. With simultaneous voting, this frequency
increases in the voting threshold and is thus largest for the unanimity
rule. To identify the underlying motives, we need to account for the fact
that different voting thresholds imply different incentives to free-ride on
the votes of other group members. We do so by considering only pivotal
voters in a sequential setting. We then develop a novel design which allows
us to disentangle several behavioral motives. Our data show that guilt
sharing and preferences for consensual decisions are important and
independent drivers of voting behavior.
|
|
Field
Trial End Date
|
Before
March 31, 2020
|
After
June 30, 2020
|
|
Field
Last Published
|
Before
December 28, 2019 03:06 PM
|
After
March 31, 2020 08:04 AM
|
|
Field
Intervention End Date
|
Before
March 31, 2020
|
After
June 30, 2020
|