Intervention (Hidden)
We present here the design of experimental games to be included in an additional wave of data collection for our lab-in-the field experiment previously registered with ID: AEARCTR-0003535. Those games have been designed to test the following hypotheses:
1-Does the prevalence of parent-bias shrinks when we allow for an equal split of resources?
2-Do parent-biased respondents have a higher willingness-to-pay to stick to their plans to invest in their children?
3-Do respondents demand less commitment devices to stick to their plans to invest in someone else's child than in their own?
4-Do parent-biased respondents have a higher willingness-to-pay to open a savings' account in their child's name rather than their own?
1-Does the prevalence of parent-bias shrinks when we allow for an equal split of resources?
We contrast a baseline measure of parent-bias to a measure of parent-bias when we allow for equal split of resources
Baseline measure:
We define parent-biased respondents as respondents who discount their own consumption to a larger extent than that of their children. We re-elicit parent-bias in this wave of data collection.
To do so, we ask parents to allocate five packs of peanuts between themselves and their child to be consumed two days later (t=2) and a month later (t=3). To help with this decision, the parents are invited to share 5 packets of peanuts between two plates, one entitled "you, in two days", the other one ``Your child in two days''. The enumerator records this decision. Then the parents are invited to do the same thing for the next allocation. To ensure that all decisions are consequential, the parents are informed that a randomly drawn subset of the respondents will see their decision implemented.
Parent-bias when allowing for an equalitarian split
We will study how the distribution of parent-bias changes when we allow respondents to chose an equalitarian split. To do so, we ask parents to allocate five packs of peanuts between themselves and their child to be consumed two days later (t=2) and a month later, but we allow them to allocate half packets, so that they can choose a 2.5/2.5 allocation if needed. We still define parent-biased respondents as those deciding to allocate a larger share of peanuts to their child at t=3 than t=2
2-Do parent-biased respondents have a higher willingness-to-pay to stick to their plans to invest in their children?
We start by telling respondents that they are entering a lotery in which they can earn 0 or 2,000 kwachas, that they will receive on September 1st, approximately 2 months after the interview. They only learn the outcome of the lotery at the end of the interview. They have the possibility to either receive the lotery price in cash card or to purchase one week (1 hour/day for a week) of tutoring for their child.
We give the parents the possibility to commit to this decision. They are given the choice between having or giving up the possibility to make this choice again just before receiving the money/the tutoring. The flexible option comes accompanied with a bonus. The participants make this decision for different bonus values. At the end of the survey, the participants learn which bonus has been randomly picked and their decision for that amount is executed. This design is a version of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism and ensures that all questions are incentive-compatible.
We measure the parents' willingness-to-pay for investments in children through a series of three to four interdependent binary choices between receiving money or the investment in the child, following a ``staircase'' procedure
Attaching a bonus to the flexible option may be signalling to the parents what is the ``right decision''. We also ask the respondent to chose between the flexible or commitment option with a positive bonus attached to the commitment option.
3-Do respondents demand less commitment devices to stick to their plans to invest in someone else's child than in their own?
The respondents enter another lotery in which they can earn 0 or 2000 kwachas, that they would receive on September 1st. They are informed that they can chose between receiving that money in cash cards or to instead offer a week of tutoring to another person's child. They are informed that they will not know who this other child is andd that neither the beneficiary child nor her family would be informed of the respondent's identity, irrespective of their choice.
They are then given the choice between having or giving up the possibility to make this choice again just before receiving the money/the tutoring. The flexible option comes accompanied with a bonus. The participants make this decision for different bonus values. At the end of the survey, the participants learn which bonus has been randomly picked and their decision for that amount is executed.
4-Do parent-biased respondents have a higher willingness-to-pay to open a savings' account in their child's name rather than their own?
The respondents enter a lotery in which they can earn 0 or 10,000 kwachas. Before learning the lotery outcome, they can choose between 2 options:
1- Receiving the whole money in cash;
2- Opening a savings account at the National bank in their child's name and depositing 5,000 kwachas. Our team will accompany the respondent and the child at the bank and help them with the paper work. The respondent will receive the remaining money in cash.
The respondent are asked this question, with a different “price” associated with each option. If the respondent earns 10,000 kwachas in the lotery, a price will be randomly chosen at the end of the interview and the respondent's decision at that price will be executed.
We measure the parents' willingness-to-pay for the savings' account through a series of three interdependent binary choices. We also elicit the parents' willingness-to-pay to receive the whole money in cash.
Finally, we elicit the parents' relative willingness-to-pay to open a bank account in their name or in their child's name, following the same procedure.