x

We are happy to announce that all trial registrations will now be issued DOIs (digital object identifiers). For more information, see here.
Risk aversion, earning uncertainty and labour supply
Last registered on October 25, 2019

Pre-Trial

Trial Information
General Information
Title
Risk aversion, earning uncertainty and labour supply
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0004499
Initial registration date
July 30, 2019
Last updated
October 25, 2019 5:28 AM EDT
Location(s)

This section is unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access to this information.

Request Information
Primary Investigator
Affiliation
University of Essex
Other Primary Investigator(s)
Additional Trial Information
Status
On going
Start date
2019-07-22
End date
2020-06-01
Secondary IDs
Abstract
The goal of the experiment is to test the existence of a causal effect of earnings uncertainty on labour supply at the extensive margin in the presence of out-of-work benefits. The design of the experiment is strongly inspired by how zero hours contracts work, i.e. what is uncertain is not the pay rate itself but the availability of work. At the same time, if work is not available, participants do not have an alternative possibility of gaining income but they do gain ‘leisure’. The experiment aims to study the decision to take up a job with insecure pay when there is an alternative out of work benefit that is lost.
External Link(s)
Registration Citation
Citation
Avram, Silvia. 2019. "Risk aversion, earning uncertainty and labour supply." AEA RCT Registry. October 25. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4499-1.1.
Former Citation
Avram, Silvia. 2019. "Risk aversion, earning uncertainty and labour supply." AEA RCT Registry. October 25. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4499/history/55832.
Sponsors & Partners

There are documents in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access to this information.

Request Information
Experimental Details
Interventions
Intervention(s)
The intervention primarily consists in introducing uncertainty about the availability of work. Other dimensions that are varied are the pay rate and the availability of an outside option.
Intervention Start Date
2019-07-25
Intervention End Date
2019-11-08
Primary Outcomes
Primary Outcomes (end points)
The primary outcome is the decision to work or not to work under the different treatments.
The treatments vary along 3 dimensions:
1) uncertainty in the availability of work
2) the pay rate
3) The outside option: how much is leaisure paid for and is the payment certain or not.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Two outcomes are of interes:
1) whether labour supply is lower when work availability is uncertain
2) whether making the outside option more /less available influences 1)
Secondary Outcomes
Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Risk aversion measurement.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Experimental Design
Experimental Design
Participants choose between a real-effort task and a fixed payment. The decision is repeated in 24 rounds. There are three arms. In the control group, work is always available. In the two treatment groups, work is only availabile with a 50% probability. The two treatment groups differ in the pay rate for the real-effort task. In the second phase, the availability of the fixed payment is varied.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
The randomization is done by the computer (treatment assignment) in conjunction with drawing a ball from a non-transparent urn (participant number).
Randomization Unit
The randomization is done at the individual level.
Was the treatment clustered?
No
Experiment Characteristics
Sample size: planned number of clusters
400 individuals.
Sample size: planned number of observations
400 individuals.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
66 individuals phase 1 control, phase 2 control, 66 individuals phase 1 control, phase 2 benefit sanction, 66 individuals, phase 1 treatment 1, phase 2 benefit sanction, 66 individuals phase 1 treatment 2, phase 2 benefit present, 66 individuals phase 1 treatment 2, phase 2 benefit sanctions, 66 individuals phase 1 treatment 2, phase 2 benefit present.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials

There are documents in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access to this information.

Request Information
IRB
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (IRBs)
IRB Name
University of Essex, Departamental Ethics Officer
IRB Approval Date
2019-05-14
IRB Approval Number
N/A