Positive vs. Negative Incentives for Compliance: Evaluating a Randomized Tax Holiday

Last registered on December 13, 2014
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Positive vs. Negative Incentives for Compliance: Evaluating a Randomized Tax Holiday
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0000452
Initial registration date
July 23, 2014

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
July 23, 2014, 9:26 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated
December 13, 2014, 3:01 PM EST

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

Country
Uruguay
Region
Latin America

Primary Investigator

Name
Thad Dunning
Affiliation
University of California, Berkeley
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Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Guadalupe Tuñón
PI Affiliation
University of California, Berkeley
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PI Name
Fernando Rosenblatt
PI Affiliation
Universidad Diego Portales, Santiago, Chile
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PI Name
Rafael Piñeiro
PI Affiliation
Universidad Católica, Montevideo, Uruguay
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PI Name
Felipe Monestier
PI Affiliation
Universidad de la Republica, Montevideo, Uruguay
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Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2014-06-25
End date
2017-05-07
Keywords
Governance
Additional Keywords
Tax compliance, developing countries, state capacity, positive vs. negative incentives; field experiment, natural experiment, information, lottery
JEL code(s)
H2, H3, O1
Secondary IDs
EGAP registry (82)
Abstract
Can positive rather than negative incentives boost tax compliance in developing countries? We study a unique randomized policy innovation in Montevideo, Uruguay, in which the municipal government raffles tax holidays to good taxpayers who are current on past payments. Using unusual access to over-time tax payment records as well as survey data, we assess the impact of holidays on subsequent tax compliance, as well as citizens' attitudes towards taxation and governance. We also use field and survey experiments to study the effects of informing eligible and ineligible taxpayers about the rebate lottery---which has not been effectively advertised by the government. Our informational treatments allow us to compare the influence of priming negative incentives for tax compliance, such as fines and punishment for non-payment, with the positive inducement provided by the lottery.
External Link(s)
Pre-analysis plan

Registration Citation

Citation
Dunning, Thad et al. 2014. "Positive vs. Negative Incentives for Compliance: Evaluating a Randomized Tax Holiday." AEA RCT Registry. December 13. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.452-4.0
Former Citation
Dunning, Thad et al. 2014. "Positive vs. Negative Incentives for Compliance: Evaluating a Randomized Tax Holiday." AEA RCT Registry. December 13. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/452/history/3294
Sponsors & Partners

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Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Please see detailed pre-analysis plan.
Intervention Start Date
2014-06-27
Intervention End Date
2014-07-16

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Please see detailed pre-analysis plan.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Please see detailed pre-analysis plan.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Please see detailed pre-analysis plan.
Experimental Design Details
Please see detailed pre-analysis plan.
Randomization Method
Please see detailed pre-analysis plan.
Randomization Unit
Please see detailed pre-analysis plan.
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
Please see detailed pre-analysis plan.
Sample size: planned number of observations
Please see detailed pre-analysis plan.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
Please see detailed pre-analysis plan.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Please see detailed pre-analysis plan.
Supporting Documents and Materials

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IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Office for the Protection of Human Subjects, University of California, Berkeley
IRB Approval Date
2014-05-12
IRB Approval Number
Protocol ID 2014-04-6286
Analysis Plan

Analysis Plan Documents

Engendering+Compliance_PreAnalysis+Plan.pdf

MD5: 26fc630aa5b394495a5a62643938d98c

SHA1: e70cdde4142a87abf3d2551a5d3943ca3f699803

Uploaded At: July 23, 2014

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials