x

We are happy to announce that all trial registrations will now be issued DOIs (digital object identifiers). For more information, see here.
Moral nudges and financial advice
Last registered on August 14, 2019

Pre-Trial

Trial Information
General Information
Title
Moral nudges and financial advice
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0004533
Initial registration date
August 11, 2019
Last updated
August 14, 2019 5:11 PM EDT
Location(s)

This section is unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access to this information.

Request Information
Primary Investigator
Affiliation
Radboud University
Other Primary Investigator(s)
PI Affiliation
University Innsbruck
Additional Trial Information
Status
In development
Start date
2019-08-12
End date
2020-07-31
Secondary IDs
Abstract
We investigate whether moral nudges influence behavior of bank employees in financial credence goods situations. Usually, bank customers seek financial advice because they do not have sufficient information about complex financial products. This asymmetric information makes the market for financial advice a credence good market (Darby and Karni, 1973) – i.e., even after consumption customers cannot judge whether the “treatment” of the service was appropriate or not. Although there is vast literature focusing on asymmetric information and especially its relevance for advisers’ incentives, there is only little research on how the credence goods properties affect financial advisers’ behavior. Therefore, in this study, we analyze whether and how nudging employees with questions about the moral dimension of financial advice and/or ethical reminders influence their ethical behavior in their financial advice to clients.
External Link(s)
Registration Citation
Citation
Kirchler, Michael and Utz Weitzel. 2019. "Moral nudges and financial advice." AEA RCT Registry. August 14. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4533-1.0.
Former Citation
Kirchler, Michael and Utz Weitzel. 2019. "Moral nudges and financial advice." AEA RCT Registry. August 14. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4533/history/51756.
Sponsors & Partners

There are documents in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access to this information.

Request Information
Experimental Details
Interventions
Intervention(s)
In Treatment 1, the banker’s oath is mentioned before asking financial advice on an ethical financial dilemma. In Treatment 2, an ethical reminder that is unrelated to the banker’s oath is mentioned before asking advice for the same ethical dilemma. In the control treatment, neither the banker’s oath nor the ethical reminder is mentioned before asking for financial advice. Depending on budget constraints, it is possible that we repeat the experiment in a different country to test for country specific effects.
Intervention Start Date
2019-08-12
Intervention End Date
2019-12-20
Primary Outcomes
Primary Outcomes (end points)
The financial advice that the bank employee gives in response to the ethical financial dilemma presented by the client.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
The financial advice allows us to measure the degree of ethicality of the response.
1. We expect that mentioning the oath affects the ethicality of advisers’ response in comparison to the control treatment.
2. It is possible that the mentioning of the oath simply acts as an ethical reminder. We therefore also administer Treatment 2, which is unrelated to the oath, and compare it to Treatment 1 and the control treatment.
3. There is evidence that the client’s gender is related to financial advice, i.e. female clients receive financial advice that is less in their favor compared to males. We therefore also analyze possible treatment effects in combination with clients’ gender.
Secondary Outcomes
Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Experimental Design
Experimental Design
Between subjects design. Field experiment.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
software
Randomization Unit
Individual
Was the treatment clustered?
No
Experiment Characteristics
Sample size: planned number of clusters
at least 150 observations; higher N depends on budget constraints
Sample size: planned number of observations
at least 150 observations; higher N depends on budget constraints
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
at least 50 observations; higher N depends on budget constraints
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials

There are documents in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access to this information.

Request Information
IRB
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (IRBs)
IRB Name
Innsbruck University Internal Review Board
IRB Approval Date
2019-01-25
IRB Approval Number
08/2019