Field
Abstract
|
Before
We study the effects of complexity and market centralization in a land trading game. The game involves groups of 18 participants in villages in Masaka, Uganda. Participants are endowed with game currency and a set of artificial land plots on a "map", and trade plots among themselves to earn returns. They earn returns if they improve the efficiency of the land allocation in the game, which can be achieved by sorting higher "ability" players to better plots and/or by consolidating fragmented plots into contiguous blocks.
Our treatment variations are
1. Map complexity: some maps are "simple" because there are many possible payoff-equivalent first-best allocations of plots. Some maps are "complex" because there are only a few. Complexity is varied by minimally altering maps to add non-trading plots. These decrease the number of possible ways to arrange contiguous blocks of plots into the map.
2. Trade centralization: trade is either "decentralized," with participants trading free-form among themselves within the village, or "centralized," taking place with all participants present in the same location at the same time.
We will study the effects of these treatments on trading efficiency, measured by the share of possible gains from trade achieved in the game.
|
After
We study the effects of complexity and market centralization in a land trading game. The game involves groups of 18 participants in villages in Masaka, Uganda. Participants are endowed with game currency and a set of artificial land plots on a "map", and trade plots among themselves to earn returns. They earn returns if they improve the efficiency of the land allocation in the game, which can be achieved by sorting higher "ability" players to better plots and/or by consolidating fragmented plots into contiguous blocks.
Our treatment variations are
1. Map complexity: some maps are "simple" because there are many possible payoff-equivalent first-best allocations of plots. Some maps are "complex" because there are only a few. Complexity is varied by minimally altering maps to add non-trading plots. These decrease the number of possible ways to arrange contiguous blocks of plots into the map.
2. Trade centralization: trade is either "decentralized," with participants trading free-form among themselves within the village, or "centralized," taking place with all participants present in the same location at the same time.
We will study the effects of these treatments on trading efficiency, measured by the share of possible gains from trade achieved in the game, and the distribution of those gains, measured by the log-utility Atkinson index of final payoffs.
|
Field
Last Published
|
Before
August 20, 2019 10:46 AM
|
After
November 27, 2019 02:57 PM
|
Field
Intervention End Date
|
Before
December 31, 2019
|
After
November 29, 2019
|
Field
Primary Outcomes (End Points)
|
Before
Overall trading efficiency. Trading efficiency broken down into a) Trading efficiency due to defragmentation, b) Trading efficiency due to sorting
|
After
Overall trading efficiency. Trading efficiency broken down into a) Trading efficiency due to defragmentation, b) Trading efficiency due to sorting, c) Trading efficiency due to exposure losses
Distribution of final payoffs measured by the log-utility Atkinson index.
|
Field
Primary Outcomes (Explanation)
|
Before
Overall trading efficiency (share of potential gains from trade realized)
Trading efficiency due to defragmentation (share of potential gains from defragmenting land)
Trading efficiency due to sorting (share of potential gains from sorting high types to high quality land)
|
After
Overall trading efficiency (share of potential gains from trade realized)
Trading efficiency due to defragmentation (share of potential gains from defragmenting land)
Trading efficiency due to sorting (share of potential gains from sorting high types to high quality land)
Trading efficiency due to exposure losses (share of potential gains foregone due to some participants holding "too much" land)
Distribution of final payoffs measured by the log-utility Atkinson index (1 minus the ratio of the geometric and arithmetic means of final payoffs)
|
Field
Planned Number of Clusters
|
Before
64 villages
Each village plays a simple map followed by a complex map, or a complex map followed by a simple map. The second week's game is also followed by a trading day.
|
After
68 villages
Each village plays a simple map followed by a complex map, or a complex map followed by a simple map. The second week's game is also followed by a trading day.
|
Field
Planned Number of Observations
|
Before
192 in total. 3 observations per village: a week 1 trading efficiency outcome, a week 2 pre-trading day efficiency outcome, and a week 2 post-trading day efficiency outcome.
|
After
204 in total. 3 observations per village: a week 1 trading efficiency outcome, a week 2 pre-trading day efficiency outcome, and a week 2 post-trading day efficiency outcome.
|
Field
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
|
Before
All villages play the simple treatment once and the complex treatment once, so 64 simple and 64 complex.
The trading day is played at the end of week 2, so we will have 32 observations for simple post-trading day and 32 for complex post-trading day.
|
After
All villages play the simple treatment once and the complex treatment once, so 68 simple and 68 complex.
The trading day is played at the end of week 2, so we will have 34 observations for simple post-trading day and 34 for complex post-trading day.
|