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Abstract
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Before
Why do autocrats implement new technologies aimed at increasing transparency - to curb corruption or to create a veneer of democracy? This project studies the effects of technology of video monitoring of election on its outcomes, the behavior of local authorities and citizens' beliefs in one prominent authoritarian regime, Russia. Using administrative data on results of the 2018 Presidential election, I show that video monitoring suppresses voter turnout by 5% and reduces the number of votes cast for the incumbent by 8.5%, consistent with an improvement in electoral accountability. However, these effects are partially mitigated by displacement of votes to nearby unmonitored polling stations. To test the mechanisms and explore effects on citizens’ beliefs, I conduct online and in-person survey experiments ahead of the 2019 Single Voting Day. In particular, I introduce a reminder to respondents in the treatment group that many polling stations in the upcoming election will have video monitoring and that they can freely observe it on the government-run website. Afterward, I elicit respondents' voting behavior and beliefs, perceptions of electoral integrity, and general views on democracy.
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After
Why do autocrats implement new technologies aimed at increasing transparency - to curb corruption or to create a veneer of democracy? This project studies the effects of technology of video monitoring of election on its outcomes, the behavior of local authorities and citizens' beliefs in one prominent authoritarian regime, Russia. Using administrative data on results of the 2018 Presidential election, I show that video monitoring suppressed voter turnout by 5% and reduced the number of votes cast for the incumbent by 8.5%, consistent with an improvement in electoral accountability. However, these effects were partially mitigated by displacement of votes to nearby unmonitored polling stations. To test the mechanisms and evaluate the effects of video monitoring on citizens’ beliefs and behavior, I conduct online and in-person survey experiments ahead of the 2019 Single Voting Day. In particular, I remind respondents in the treatment group that many polling stations in the upcoming election will have video monitoring that anyone can freely stream on the government-run website. Afterward, I elicit respondents' voting behavior and beliefs, perceptions about elections, and general views on democracy.
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Last Published
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Before
August 30, 2019 09:59 AM
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After
September 04, 2019 07:55 PM
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Intervention (Public)
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Before
The intervention consists of two survey experiments conducted online and in-person. The treatment group receives a reminder that many polling stations in the upcoming election will be equipped with video monitoring. It also provides information that the government-run website <name> will freely stream the election day online. The control group does not receive any information about video monitoring. After the treatment is introduced, I elicit respondents’ voting behavior and beliefs, perceptions of electoral integrity, and general views on democracy. To elicit voter intimidation, I cross-randomize a listing experiment over the main treatment.
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After
The intervention consists of two survey experiments conducted online and in-person. The treatment group receives a reminder that many polling stations in the upcoming election will be equipped with video monitoring. It also provides information that the government-run website <name> will freely stream the election day online. The control group does not receive any information about video monitoring. After the treatment is introduced, I elicit respondents’ voting behavior and beliefs, trust in elections, and general views on democracy. To elicit voter intimidation, I cross-randomize a listing experiment over the main treatment.
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Primary Outcomes (End Points)
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Before
Voting behavior, Voter intimidation, Perceptions of electoral integrity, Views on democracy
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After
Voting behavior, Voter intimidation, Trust in elections, Views on democracy
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Primary Outcomes (Explanation)
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Before
Voting Behavior: An index that combines outcomes of self-reported turnout, voting for the ruling party, and second-order beliefs about the voting behavior of others.
Voter Intimidation: The number of items named in an embedded listing experiment that is cross-randomized over the main experiment.
Perceptions of electoral integrity: An index that combines outcomes of trust in election results and beliefs about elections leading to improvements.
Views on democracy: An index that combines outcomes of a state of democracy in Russia, perceptions of democratic values, and beliefs on tax compliance.
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After
Voting Behavior: An index that combines outcomes of self-reported turnout, voting for the ruling party, and second-order beliefs about the voting behavior of others.
Voter Intimidation: The number of items named in an embedded listing experiment that is cross-randomized over the main experiment.
Trust in Elections: An index that combines outcomes of trust in election results and beliefs about elections leading to improvements.
Views on Democracy: An index that combines outcomes of a state of democracy in Russia, perceptions of democratic values, and beliefs on tax compliance.
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Planned Number of Observations
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Before
In-person survey: A subsample of a nationally representative sample of 1,600 respondents who will indicate that there will be elections in their locality on the 2019 Single Voting Day.
Online survey: 1600 respondents who reside in the regions that will have gubernatorial elections on the 2019 Single Voting Day.
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After
(1) In-person survey: A subsample of a nationally representative sample of 1,600 respondents who will indicate that there will be elections in their locality on the 2019 Single Voting Day (approximately 60% of the full sample according to the electoral calendar).
(2) Online survey: 1600 respondents who reside in the regions that will have gubernatorial elections on the 2019 Single Voting Day.
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Additional Keyword(s)
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Before
Corruption, Elections, Fraud, Technologies, Video Monitoring
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After
Autocrats, Corruption, Elections, Fraud, ICT, Video Monitoring
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Secondary Outcomes (End Points)
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Before
Effectiveness and approval of video monitoring, Knowledge about video monitoring, Engagement in video monitoring
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After
Knowledge about video monitoring, Engagement in video monitoring, Effectiveness of video monitoring
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