The American Economic Association's registry for randomized controlled trials
NEW UPDATE: Completed trials may now upload and register supplementary documents (e.g. null results reports, populated pre-analysis plans, or post-trial results reports) in the Post Trial section under Reports, Papers, & Other Materials.
Contract Design and Insurance Demand
Last registered on August 30, 2019
View Trial History
Contract Design and Insurance Demand
Initial registration date
August 28, 2019
August 30, 2019 10:01 AM EDT
University of Maryland
Contact Primary Investigator
Other Primary Investigator(s)
Additional Trial Information
Finance & Microfinance
This paper uses data from a randomized experiment with around 1700 households in rural China to study the effect on insurance take-up of offering a menu of insurance contracts rather than a single one. Surprisingly, I find that offering more choices increases the take-up rate of the basic contract (lowest premium and payout) by 30%, while only a small proportion of farmers choose contracts with higher premiums and payouts. Information inference explanation is ruled out by the fact that the effect holds even when all farmers are aware of the existence of all contracts. A policy implication is that strategically offering a menu of contracts can be an easy and cheap way to improve insurance take-up.
Cai, Jing. 2019. "Contract Design and Insurance Demand." AEA RCT Registry. August 30.
Sponsors & Partners
Intervention Start Date
Intervention End Date
Primary Outcomes (end points)
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
I use a two-year randomized experiment to identify the role of contract design in influencing insurance demand. The experimental site includes 38 randomly selected villages in Jiangxi Province with around 1800 households. The first year experiment was carried out in Spring 2010, including 13 villages with around 560 households. The main intervention is to randomize the menu of insurance contracts offered to farmers. The first year data is used to test the impact of offering different menus of contracts on insurance take-up. The second year experiment was implemented in Spring 2011, with a different set of 25 villages (around 1200 households), in order to identify two different mechanisms of the contract effect: a context effect and an information effect. The second year design includes a 4 by 2 randomizations to identify different mechanisms of the contract effect. First, I randomize four types of contract menus on the household level. In those menus, contracts differ in the level of insurance premium, government subsidy, and maximum payouts. The second randomization is an information treatment. Within each of the four contract groups, half of the households were provided with two additional pieces of information, including the existence of other contracts and the real probability of disasters.
Experimental Design Details
randomization done in office by a computer
Was the treatment clustered?
Sample size: planned number of clusters
Sample size: planned number of observations
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
500 control, 1500 treated
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (IRBs)
Insurance Take-up and the Impact of Insurance Provision on Agricultural Outcomes
IRB Approval Date
IRB Approval Number
Post Trial Information
Is the intervention completed?
Is data collection complete?
Is public data available?
Reports, Papers & Other Materials
REPORTS & OTHER MATERIALS