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Last Published September 24, 2019 07:55 PM March 25, 2020 01:20 PM
Intervention (Public) The main objective of the intervention is to reduce teacher sorting in terms of quality (e.g., teachers primarily applying to the best schools). In order to do this, we test two different treatment arms in one region and one treatment arm in another region. Region 1) The first arm was designed to prime extrinsic motivations (i.e., monetary or career-related rewards that receive teachers that choose "disadvantaged" schools). The second one was designed to prime intrinsic motivations (i.e., the joy of helping students of lower-income families to thrive). The idea is to test the effect of each of these arms versus a control/placebo group and also between them, so as to understand if intrinsic and/or extrinsic motivations are important to shape teachers' preferences related to school choice. One important thing to note is that, although in one arm extrinsic 'rewards' were emphasized in the messages while in the other one the emphasis was put on intrinsic 'rewards', in both (as well as in the control group) there are monetary incentives to teachers that choose 'disadvantaged schools'. The three arms (controls and two treatments) were designed as "packages" of interventions, mainly implemented through two channels: text messages (SMS) and the online platforms prospective teachers use to apply for schools to work. The intervention started in early August, a week before teachers typically enter the platform to select schools, which happens after prospective teachers passed the national exam. The intervention covered the entire country at all levels (basic, primary and high school teachers). Treatment 1 ("extrinsic motivations"): 1) 6 text messages (2, 4, 6, 7, 13, 15 and 20 of August): messages suggested teachers take a look in the platform to the schools that include monetary incentives AND where they could have a faster progression in their careers (note: in "disadvantaged" schools career progression is faster as an incentive for teachers to choose them). Some of them refer explicitly to the potential amount they could make in Peruvian Soles. Others were more generic, but always referring to the extrinsic/career-related incentives. 2) In the platform: an online "exercise" was implemented. Teachers have to do it before choosing the schools they want to apply. The instructions show the following text (in Spanish): "Thanks for being part of this process. In which way do you think the monetary incentives for disadvantaged schools promote teachers' wellbeing? We would like you to take a few minutes to analyze this question and share your thoughts with us. Your opinion is very valuable for us and will only be used for informative purposes of the Ministry. The answer will not affect your allocation. Thank you!" The text was clearly related to the extrinsic motivations to choose some schools (those with monetary incentives) and to reflect on that. Treatment 2 ("intrinsic motivations"): 1) 6 text messages (2, 4, 6, 7, 13, 15 and 20 of August): messages suggested teachers to take a look in the platform to the schools in which they could have a more significant impact on the learning of the students. They were written in a way in which the role of a teacher as a "life changer" and the joy of helping students to thrive was emphasized. 2) In the platform: an online "exercise" was implemented. Teachers have to do it before choosing the schools they want to apply. The instructions show the following text (in Spanish): "Thanks for choosing to be a teacher and helping to generate an improvement in students' learning! We would like you to share with us the main reasons that motivated you to become a teacher. We would like you to take a few minutes to think and share your thoughts with us, about what motivated you to choose this path. Your opinion is very valuable for us and will only be used for informative purposes of the Ministry. The answer will not affect your allocation. Thank you!" The message was written in a way that referred clearly to the intrinsic motivations of a teacher. Moreover, "teacher" was referred as an identity (e.g., the individual chose "to be" a teacher). Control ("Placebo): 1) 6 text messages (2, 4, 6, 7, 13, 15 and 20 of August): messages were neutral, just reminding teachers about the deadlines to select a school. 2) In the platform: an online "exercise" was implemented. Teachers have to do it before choosing the schools they want to apply. The instructions show the following text (in Spanish): "What is your opinion about the application process to choose a school? Your opinion is very valuable for us and will only be used for informative purposes of the Ministry. The answer will not affect your allocation. Thank you!" The message was completely neutral. In the three arms (control and the two treatments) there are monetary incentives in place for those that choose 'disadvantaged schools'. Region 2 (Lima+Callao): Only T2 was implemented. This is because in those regions there were no schools with monetary incentives. Therefore, the interpretation in this case will be different than in the other regions: none of the arms have monetary incentives for teachers choosing disadvantaged schools and therefore in this region we have a more "pure" measurement of the "intrinsic motivations" intervention. The main objective of the intervention is to reduce teacher sorting in terms of quality (e.g., teachers primarily applying to the best schools). In order to do this, we test two different treatment arms in one region and one treatment arm in another region. Region 1) The first arm was designed to prime extrinsic motivations (i.e., monetary or career-related rewards that receive teachers that choose "disadvantaged" schools). The second one was designed to prime intrinsic motivations (i.e., the joy of helping students of lower-income families to thrive). The idea is to test the effect of each of these arms versus a control/placebo group and also between them, so as to understand if intrinsic and/or extrinsic motivations are important to shape teachers' preferences related to school choice. One important thing to note is that, although in one arm extrinsic 'rewards' were emphasized in the messages while in the other one the emphasis was put on intrinsic 'rewards', in both (as well as in the control group) there are monetary incentives to teachers that choose 'disadvantaged schools'. The three arms (controls and two treatments) were designed as "packages" of interventions, mainly implemented through two channels: text messages (SMS) and the online platforms prospective teachers use to apply for schools to work. The intervention started in early August, a week before teachers typically enter the platform to select schools, which happens after prospective teachers passed the national exam. The intervention covered the entire country at all levels (basic, primary and high school teachers). Treatment 1 ("extrinsic motivations"): 1) 6 text messages (2, 4, 6, 7, 13, 15 and 20 of August): messages suggested teachers take a look in the platform to the schools that include monetary incentives AND where they could have a faster progression in their careers (note: in "disadvantaged" schools career progression is faster as an incentive for teachers to choose them). Some of them refer explicitly to the potential amount they could make in Peruvian Soles. Others were more generic, but always referring to the extrinsic/career-related incentives. 2) In the platform: an online "exercise" was implemented. Teachers have to do it before choosing the schools they want to apply. The instructions show the following text (in Spanish): "Thanks for being part of this process. In which way do you think the monetary incentives for disadvantaged schools promote teachers' wellbeing? We would like you to take a few minutes to analyze this question and share your thoughts with us. Your opinion is very valuable for us and will only be used for informative purposes of the Ministry. The answer will not affect your allocation. Thank you!" The text was clearly related to the extrinsic motivations to choose some schools (those with monetary incentives) and to reflect on that. Treatment 2 ("intrinsic motivations"): 1) 6 text messages (2, 4, 6, 7, 13, 15 and 20 of August): messages suggested teachers to take a look in the platform to the schools in which they could have a more significant impact on the learning of the students. They were written in a way in which the role of a teacher as a "life changer" and the joy of helping students to thrive was emphasized. 2) In the platform: an online "exercise" was implemented. Teachers have to do it before choosing the schools they want to apply. The instructions show the following text (in Spanish): "Thanks for choosing to be a teacher and helping to generate an improvement in students' learning! We would like you to share with us the main reasons that motivated you to become a teacher. We would like you to take a few minutes to think and share your thoughts with us, about what motivated you to choose this path. Your opinion is very valuable for us and will only be used for informative purposes of the Ministry. The answer will not affect your allocation. Thank you!" The message was written in a way that referred clearly to the intrinsic motivations of a teacher. Moreover, "teacher" was referred as an identity (e.g., the individual chose "to be" a teacher). Control ("Placebo): 1) 6 text messages (2, 4, 6, 7, 13, 15 and 20 of August): messages were neutral, just reminding teachers about the deadlines to select a school. 2) In the platform: an online "exercise" was implemented. Teachers have to do it before choosing the schools they want to apply. The instructions show the following text (in Spanish): "What is your opinion about the application process to choose a school? Your opinion is very valuable for us and will only be used for informative purposes of the Ministry. The answer will not affect your allocation. Thank you!" The message was completely neutral. In ALL conditions: Also in the platform: in every treatment condition, targeted schools were labeled with a small icon showing three things: a small heart, a bag of money and a person "walking up" stairs. Also, in all three conditions, when teachers hovered the pointer over the icon, a small pop-up was displayed with a description of the icon. However, small variations were introduced in the content of the pop-up to emphasize different things, depending on the condition. In the case of the "extrinsic" treatment, the emphasis was on the amount of money the teacher would get and in the speeding up of the teaching career. In the "intrinsic" treatment, the "social impact" was emphasized. It is important to note that in all three conditions the information was essentially the same. For instance, in all of them the pop up would clarify that the "heart icon" means that in that schools, teachers would have a larger social impact on students' learning. However, only in the "intrinsic condition", the pop-up was written to emphasize teachers' altruistic identity (i.e. "schools most in need that require teachers like you!" versus "schools in which you can have a larger effect on students' learning"). In the three arms (control and the two treatments) there are monetary incentives in place for those that choose 'disadvantaged schools'. Region 2 (Lima+Callao): Only T2 was implemented. This is because in those regions there were no schools with monetary incentives. Therefore, the interpretation in this case will be different than in the other regions: none of the arms have monetary incentives for teachers choosing disadvantaged schools and therefore in this region we have a more "pure" measurement of the "intrinsic motivations" intervention.
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