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Field
Abstract
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Before
There are 80,000 officers in the Army (OUSD 2018) who serve in leadership roles across hundreds of military bases across the globe. Each year, over ten thousand officers apply for transfers to new units within the military. Because officers are paid according to government pay scales, officers and bases are not able to convey their preferences through a wage negotiation process. As a result, this is an example of matching market without prices. Currently, this officer to unit matching is implemented manually by the US Army’s Human Resources Command (HRC). This matching is time intensive for the Army’s HRC to implement and is opaque to participants. We propose using a randomized controlled trial to measure the impact of replacing this status quo assignment process with a system based on insights from matching and market design on match outcomes.
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After
We propose using a randomized controlled trial to measure the impact of replacing a status quo job assignment process within a large-scale employer with a system based on insights from matching and market design on match outcomes, in particular, using a deferred acceptance algorithm to match employees with positions.
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