Back to History

Fields Changed


Field Before After
Study Withdrawn No
Intervention Completion Date December 30, 2019
Data Collection Complete Yes
Final Sample Size: Number of Clusters (Unit of Randomization) 6
Was attrition correlated with treatment status? No
Final Sample Size: Total Number of Observations 120
Final Sample Size (or Number of Clusters) by Treatment Arms 6 teams negotiated according to rules of Paris agreement, 6 teams negotiated a uniform minimum carbon price.
Data Collection Completion Date December 30, 2019
Back to top


Field Before After
Paper Abstract Weitzman, M.L. (2014. Can negotiating a uniform carbon price help to internalize the global warming externality? J. Assoc. Environ. Resour. Econ. 1: 29–49) proposed that focusing international climate negotiations on a uniform common commitment (such as a uniform carbon price) ismore effective than negotiations on individual commitments (as in the Paris agreement) in achieving ambitious climate action. We put this hypothesis to an experimental test by simulating international negotiations on climate change in collaboration with Model United Nations associations. This novel experimental format combines some of the advantages of lab and field experiments. Our results offer support for Weitzman’s hypothesis and indicate that negotiating a common commitment on a uniform carbon pricemay yield higher emission reductions in the long run and more participation than individual commitments à la Paris.
Paper Citation Hofmann, Elisa, Lucas Kyriacou, and Klaus M. Schmidt, A Model United Nations Experiment on Climate Negotiations, Journal of Economics and Statistics 2023, 243(5), 543-566
Paper URL
Back to top

Post Trial Documents

Field Before After
Description Dataset
Citation Hofmann, Elisa; Kyriacou, Lucas; Schmidt, Klaus M. (2022): A Model United Nations Experiment on Climate Negotiations (replication data). Version: 1. Journal of Economics and Statistics. Dataset.
Back to top