Field
Abstract
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Before
We use Model United Nations simulations of the Conference of the Parties to study climate change negotiations under two different negotiation protocols. One protocol is similar to the Paris negotiations: Countries have to agree on a non-binding resolution on the reduction of world-wide CO2 emissions, and each country has to decide on a nationally determined voluntary contribution, i.e. a commitment by how much to reduce its own emissions. The second protocol focuses on a uniform carbon price. Countries have to agree to a minimum carbon price that applies to all countries signing the resolution. Schmidt and Ockenfels (2019) have shown in an abstract laboratory experiment that negotiations on a uniform minimum price for carbon achieve substantially higher reductions of CO2 emissions than Paris style negotiations. Our study builds upon this laboratory experiments and extends its scope methodologically and contextually. We conduct a field experiment, using for the first time a Model United Nations simulation of the Conference of the Parties to explore (with increased external validity) the effect of two negotiation mechanism on the CO2 emissions reduction. We randomly assign delegates to two treatments (1) Paris, (2) Uniform Global Carbon Price and measure the CO2 emissions reductions goals worldwide and at the national level. The experiment is designed such that the two treatments differ only in the negotiation protocol.
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After
We organize one-day Model United Nations conferences as Conferences of the Parties (COP) to study climate change negotiations under two different negotiation protocols.
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Field
Last Published
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Before
October 11, 2019 11:34 AM
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After
October 23, 2019 08:52 AM
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Field
Intervention (Public)
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Before
We organize one-day Model United Nations conferences as Conferences of the Parties (COP) in order to investigate whether the negotiation environment influences the CO2 emissions reduction.
Data in three pilot studies have already been collected in 2018 and 2019 (Bern, Munich, Zurich).
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After
See pre-analysis plan (PAP)
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Field
Primary Outcomes (End Points)
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Before
Our main dependent variable are the CO2 emissions reduction on both, a worldwide and a countrywide level and the voting decisions in favor / against the Resolution.
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After
See pre-analysis plan (PAP)
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Field
Experimental Design (Public)
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Before
We implement two treatments in a between-subjects design: 1) Paris, 2) Uniform Global Carbon Price.
We randomly assign the subjects to the two treatments and the country they represent. Ten countries/regions participate in the respective MUN conference: Australia, Canada, China, European Union, India, Japan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, USA.
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After
See pre-analysis plan (PAP)
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Field
Randomization Method
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Before
Randomization done in office by a computer
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After
See pre-analysis plan (PAP)
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Field
Randomization Unit
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Before
individual
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After
See pre-analysis plan (PAP)
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Field
Planned Number of Clusters
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Before
Eight groups of 10 participants each at four different locations. At each location one group negotiates according to the rules of the Paris agreement, one group negotiates a carbon price.
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After
See pre-analysis plan (PAP)
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Field
Planned Number of Observations
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Before
Eight groups at four different locations. At each location one group negotiates according to the rules of the Paris agreement, one group negotiates a carbon price.
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After
See pre-analysis plan (PAP)
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Field
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
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Before
Eight groups at four different locations. At each location one group negotiates according to the rules of the Paris agreement, one group negotiates a carbon price.
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After
See pre-analysis plan (PAP)
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Field
Additional Keyword(s)
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Before
Negotiations, Climate Change, Model United Nations, Experiment, Carbon Pricing
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After
Negotiations, Climate Change, Model United Nations, Experiment
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